Policy vs. Public: A Growing Disconnect

Dear friends,

In the past few days, the Israeli government has announced an escalation of IDF presence in the Gaza Strip alongside a formalized intention to occupy the entire Strip indefinitely. This official policy direction also explicitly demotes saving Israeli hostages to a secondary priority, taking backseat to the nebulous goal of defeating Hamas. While previous rhetoric and internal political calculations have long made the Israeli public and the international community suspect this de facto prioritization, the new announcements mark a turning point in establishing official policy: the current government is openly opposing majority public opinion and international pressure in order to score points with its political base and most extreme ministerial members.

The concretization of the government’s “day after” vision to indefinite occupation entrenches their opposition to any Palestinian (or even regional) alternative to Hamas control of the Gaza Strip. In the meantime, the Palestinian Authority is making internal changes and advancing diplomatic ties abroad, in a bid to frame itself in regional and international opinion as the most viable option for future administration of Gaza, regardless of Israel’s positions. With President Trump already sidestepping Israeli interests on key strategic regional policies, the possibility of a major shift in American foreign policy regarding the Middle East remains on the table.

The TSI decreases this month from 4.78 to 4.73, a 1.2% drop.

Power Shifts and Internal Divides

The Israeli government has announced an official policy of conquering and indefinitely occupying the Gaza Strip, although what this means in terms of civilian administration of the Strip is not yet clear and is subject to internal disputes between cabinet members and IDF military officials.

Earlier in the month, right-wing hardliner Minister Smotrich attacked the new IDF Chief of Staff as well as Netanyahu for refusing to apply direct military control of civilian matters like aid distribution, and for failing to move to a “decisive” strategy (given his recent statements on the record, this refers to conquest, settlement, and annexation of the entirety of Gaza). The dispute shows a potentially powerful divide within the coalition: while Netanyahu continues to cite the Trump Plan for mass relocation of Gazans as their guiding “day after” plan (despite the Trump administration recanting and no indication of any third states willing to accept a significant number of refugees) and strings his most extreme coalition partners with periodic promises of further escalations in fighting, the lack of any translation into a clear policy vision and growing public unrest will make it more likely over time for specific parties to break away. However, the public announcement of occupation is likely to appease the extreme elements of the coalition for the time being. Additionally, given the polls showing low support for many current coalition parties, there is an extra incentive for them to hang onto power for as long as possible.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has appointed a new Deputy Chairman of the PLO, who in theory could act as successor. Hussein Al-Sheikh is a long-time Abbas confidant and an establishment figure, with a history in security coordination and close ties to Israeli and American authorities. He is seen first and foremost as a pragmatist, and continues Abbas’s positions in favor of negotiations, security coordination, and a two-state solution. The appointment is part of a series of reforms and changes that the PA is implementing, in an effort to make itself the viable and preferred option from the perspective of international and regional key actors when it comes to control of Gaza after the war. 

Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh points to mixed public opinion responses: “Palestinians are divided over the appointment. Some see it as an element of stability for the PA and an opportunity to seek pragmatic solutions with Israel after the end of the war in Gaza, such as resuming negotiations, expanding the PA's territories and returning Palestinian workers to work in Israel. However, there are those who see this move as a recipe for continuing the division between the two parts West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the political division, not returning to elections, and looking for life conditions improvement with Israel instead of political solutions.”

Daraghmeh emphasizes that Al-Sheikh is known for his harsh criticism and positions against Hamas. While this is likely to bring him more credit and approval from Israeli authorities, it distances the likelihood of internal Palestinian negotiations for a unified representative leadership. 

This month, President Abbas gave his most searing indictment to date of Hamas, cursing the organization, implying their responsibility for the situation in the Gaza Strip, and calling for the release of the Israeli hostages. Nevertheless, Israeli authorities continued to focus on undermining the Palestinian Authority, denying Jordanian airspace clearance for Mahmoud Abbas’s recent policy trip to Syria and ignoring the PA’s offer to send firefighters to assist with the massive wildfires that broke out in central Israel. Abbas has made certain diplomatic victories in the face of this opposition, holding the meeting with Syria’s new leader to discuss cooperation, and securing an invitation to the United Kingdom in order to sign a memorandum of understanding confirming the UK’s commitment to Palestinian statehood as part of a two-state solution (a measure attempting to balance between the controversy of formal recognition and diplomatic stagnation). 

Israel continues to block international aid deliveries to Gaza, in a policy that has been in place since the breakdown of the ceasefire in March. In late April, the International Court of Justice opened hearings regarding Israel’s obligation under international law to make basic supplies and resources available to Palestinian civilians. 

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The borders parameter drops to 3.5 this month, with the announcement of indefinite occupation of the Gaza Strip. The parameter for IDF military actions in Gaza rises to 7.5. Ties between the West Bank & Gaza decrease this month from 7.0 to 6.0, due to political shifts and the impact of a deterioration on both fronts.

Regional developments sideline Israel

This month saw a spate of regional developments with the potential to significantly impact the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Trump administration launched negotiations with the Iranian government regarding a nuclear deal; while President Trump has frequently implied that the US will use military force in the absence of a deal, experts and journalists estimate that both sides prefer a negotiated outcome. The Israeli government, a staunch opponent of the nuclear deal negotiated under the Obama administration (and torpedoed by Trump in his first term), appears to lack the leverage and diplomatic courage to openly criticize a process that appears to be leading to a similar deal.

In a further sign of the Trump administration’s willingness to sideline Israeli interests, the US announced a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia this past month. This signals another setback for Israeli-Saudi normalization, once seen as the core of such negotiations. The Israeli government’s inability to make any credible concessions, or indeed even change its discourse, regarding Palestinian statehood, has hobbled its diplomatic flexibility and relevance in regional considerations.

GI Deputy Director Tehila Wenger writes in the Jerusalem Post, “The historic peace treaty that the Israeli government intended to use as conclusive proof of the irrelevance of the Palestinian issue to regional normalization and stability has been aborted – because of the Palestinian issue.”

Wenger notes that the extremist political actors in the Israeli government are hamstringing its regional foreign policy, and compromising long-term security interests: “The rational answer to Israel’s growing challenges is to ally itself more closely with regional actors that have demonstrated their trustworthiness: Saudi Arabia, which took part in shooting down Iranian missiles in April 2024; Egypt and Jordan, which have kept their peace agreementswith Israel through coups, internal protests, and the current polarizing war; and the Palestinian Authority, which has maintained security coordination with Israel... Current Israeli government policies have weakened ties with these key allies at every turn.”

US President Trump travels to Riyadh in May for his first diplomatic trip abroad. It is unclear to what extent Israeli and Palestinian issues will be discussed on the visit.

Daraghmeh notes that Palestinians are pinning their hope on an American intervention, despite lack of clarity or optimistic signs: “People are waiting for the Trump trip to make a difference or open a new path towards ending the war. Without an American initiative, we are going into a new era in Gaza of full-fledged Israeli occupation and Hamas full-fledged so-called resistance. The hostages and the Palestinian people will be the victims of this operation.”

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No changes in related parameters this month.

Public opinion points the way forward

The majority of Israelis continue to support a ceasefire, with a recent Achord poll showing 55% of the population (and 74% of those with an opinion) supporting a comprehensive hostage deal and end to the war in Gaza. Around half of the population supports a regional security and policy arrangement that would include the establishment of a Palestinian state; 25% of those who voted for the current governing coalition support this position. That said, only 13% of the public is optimistic that this will take place in the near future, which is reflective both of high levels of despair as well as a historic and consistent tendency of those with pro-peace agreement positions to see themselves as a minority, regardless of actual levels of support.

Ron Gerlitz, CEO of aChord, notes that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the overwhelming Israeli concern – and the issue that can turn opposition to a two-state solution into support – is security: “The main incentive is a regional arrangement, and the bigger the regional defense alliance component is, the more support you will see, because the public is looking for security.”

The Geneva Initiative also conducted an Israeli public opinion poll in April through the Midgam professional polling company, with a focus on positions regarding regional developments and involvement in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings show that the majority (54.4%) of the public have not heard of the Egyptian plan for the “day after” in Gaza; at the same time, 47% support involvement of Arab states in day after arrangements, compared to 34% in opposition, and a higher percentage believe that international and regional involvement is necessary for ending the war and ensuring Israel’s security than those in opposition.

The Palestinian Peace Coalition (Geneva Initiative-Palestine) also commissioned a poll on May 1-4, conducted by the PSR center under Dr. Khalil Shikaki. 61% of Palestinians expressed support for the establishment of a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, with a plurality of 47% preferring a two-state solution to the alternatives of a confederation (15%) and a binational state (14%). In parallel to Israeli lack of awareness to the Cairo Initiative, 72% of Palestinians have not heard of the Global Alliance initiative led by the European Union and Saudi Arabia. On the regional front, 54% of Palestinians believe that Iran’s role in Palestine today is harmful. Only 32% believe it to be beneficial.

In the event of an agreement ending the war, 40% of the Palestinian public (46% in the Gaza Strip) supports the Palestinian Authority running affairs in Gaza. Notably, support for this in September 2024 was only 27%, signaling a 13-point rise in the last 7 months.

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Israeli public opinion rises to 3.5 this month. Palestinian public opinion holds steady at 4.5.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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