Annexation or Normalization: Trump Round Two

Annexation or Normalization

Each month of the war brings important news for the TSI, but November's developments stand out in number and impact. The new ceasefire in Lebanon, US elections, ICC arrest warrants and Israeli legislation regarding administration of the West Bank are only a few of the changes that will dramatically impact the course of the war and, in the long term, the broader conditions for a peace process.

With extremist elements in the Israeli government looking for ways to leverage the US presidential election results to further annexation and a lack of meaningful progress towards a ceasefire in Gaza, the TSI drops from 4.96 to 4.92 or 0.8% this month.

Electing Annexation?

Donald Trump won the US presidential election against Kamala Harris, while a Republican majority captured both the House and Senate. The victory will have resounding repercussions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although experts agree that it is significantly more difficult to predict the policies and approaches of a Trump administration than a Harris one.

Three of the critical areas to watch include US pressure for a ceasefire in Gaza, permission or opposition to annexation of the West Bank, and prioritization of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Gaza: President elect Trump repeatedly calling on the campaign trail for a swift end to Israel’s war in the Strip, and reportedly told President Mahmoud Abbas in a phone call this month that we would “work to stop” the war in Gaza. The call represents the Palestinian Authority’s renewed efforts to establish closer ties and mend fences with the upcoming Trump administration, after cutting ties over the Embassy move and other issues during Trump’s first term.

West Bank: One of the concerns of the peace camp, reinforced by explicit celebratory statements issued by hard-right Israeli politicians like Bezalel Smotrich, is that extremists in the governing coalition will use any concessions in Gaza as bargaining chips for advancing de jure annexation within the West Bank. Trump’s choice of Mike Huckabee, an Evangelical known for supporting settlements and biased comments about Palestinians, is a sign that annexation policies could be green-lighted by the US government. On the other hand, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Israela Oron, formerly Deputy National Security Advisor for Israel’s National Security Council, points out that “renewed settlements in Gaza isn’t exactly a Trump interest. Even though the impression is that he strengthens the extreme right-wing elements of our government, he actually has an interest in reaching a comprehensive agreement.”

Huckabee himself has noted that he will not be determining policy, and any move towards official annexation is likely to have significant repercussions for a Saudi-Israeli normalization process.

Saudi Arabia: In recent years, normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia has been a foreign policy legacy coveted by both the American and Israeli governments. However, hard right elements in the Israeli coalition have prevented talks from advancing, since Saudi Arabia’s position since the start of the war has been unequivocal: no progress without a political horizon with the Palestinians. During the last Trump presidency, Israel’s de jure annexation policies were swapped for the Abraham Accords. The closeness of Saudi-American relations under Trump, and the president elect’s repeated promises of bringing Middle East peace, could form an obstacle to the Israeli extremists’ annexation ambitions. Alternatively, we could see a repeat of 2020, with the Saudis lowering their standards for concrete progress towards a Palestinian state to mere preservation of the West Bank’s ambiguous legal status.

While acknowledging that the appointment of Huckabee as ambassador reinforced despair regarding a future Trump term amongst Palestinians, Palestinian writer Mohamed Younis also offered silver linings: “First we have the Saudi component; they insist on having a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict before any regional deal. Second, Trump is not happy with Netanyahu’s response to his proposed plan in his first term, the ‘Deal of the Century,’ which was accepted as a basis for negotiations, not as a done deal. Also, many Palestinians are optimistic that Trump has a real interest in fulfilling his promise of ending the war in Gaza.”

Israela Oron warns that the issue is far from a priority for the upcoming Trump administration. A lack of interest and vision will have significant repercussions for the region: “Despite our somewhat arrogant declaration that we unlinked the Lebanese front from Gaza, Israel hasn’t actually severed the connection between them. It’s not clear how long the ceasefire with Lebanon will last, and there’s also Iran, which is encouraging the Houthis and militant groups in Iraq to shoot missiles and drones at Israel. It’s not a reasonable situation for any state to be in, but it will continue as long as there’s no master plan for dealing with all aspects of the conflict – by Israel, of course, but more importantly by the US president elect.”

The US blocked a UN ceasefire resolution this month, arguing that it did not make a clear enough linkage between the ceasefire and release of Israeli hostages in Gaza, despite including language for unconditional release of the remaining hostages. This could be an indication that the Biden administration does not intend to use the “lame duck” period for bold moves on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Alternatively, it could signal the belief that a ceasefire can only be achieved before the end of a Biden presidency without antagonizing the Israeli government. The latter interpretation received some credibility in late November after reports of the Biden administration leveraging future UN vetoes in order to pressure the Netanyahu government’s acceptance of a ceasefire in Lebanon.

The United States parameter drops from 8.0 to 7.0 this month, due to the appointment of future US administration officials who do not support a two-state solution and the recent decision to block a UNSC resolution.

Signs of Two-State Support

A familiar refrain heard over the last year has been the oft-repeated self-fulfilling prophecy regarding the irrelevance of a two-state solution. The claim that the two-state solution is dead, unpopular and non-viable is frequently bandied about by Israeli and Palestinian radicals who have a vested political interest in convincing their societies to adopt hard-liner positions. However, it is also echoed by the pragmatic groups and leaders who believe that their own support for a political process to end the conflict is a minority position, and that the maximalist, often pro-violence approaches of the extremists are widely supported.

Two important developments this month undermine this narrative. An Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) public opinion poll of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shows 74% support for a two-state solution in Gaza and 47% support in the West Bank. No other option has higher levels of support in either region. A majority of Palestinians support non-violent means of achieving Palestinian statehood, with 47% preferring negotiations and 9% preferring non-violent resistance. A plurality (49%) of Palestinians prefer a unity government for post-war Gaza, with 18% preferring a PA-led government and 16% preferring a Hamas-led government. Only 3% of Gazans prefer a Hamas-led government.

On the Israeli side, this month Knesset opposition leader Yair Lapid delineated a “day after” plan for resolving the conflict and addressing the many regional challenges and opportunities. It includes emphasis on return of the hostages, regional involvement to ensure Israel’s security and Gazan reconstruction/rehabilitation, Israeli commitment not to allow civilian settlements into Lebanon or Gaza, normalization with Saudi Arabia, and advancement of conditions for a two-state solution.

Palestinian public opinion rises from 4.0 to 4.5.

EU Supports Peace-builders and ICC Issues Warrants

Key international actors are ready to support and strengthen the solution-oriented voices in both societies. Outgoing senior-ranking diplomat of the European Union, Josep Borrell, met with the Geneva Initiative-led Two-State Coalition this month, exchanging views with Palestinian and Israeli representatives of 25 civil society peace-building organizations. He outlined five principles for the EU to follow in effective peace-building:

1. Support for the peace camp

2. Confrontation of spoilers

3. Fight disinformation

4. Uphold international law

5. Use EU leverage towards a two-state solution.

In his remarks, Borrell points out that all member states of the EU support a two-state solution, and calls for European unity in action, in addition to statements. He also dismissed claims that joint meetings and dialogue normalize or strengthen either the occupation or terrorism, urging the Israeli and Palestinian peace builders to continue their work together: “The fact that you talk to each other does not meant that you agree with the occupation nor that you support terrorism. On the contrary, you are standing up against them. And allow me to say that you represent the best face of the future, a better future for your own people, but also a better future for the people of the other side and for the people around the world.”

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants this month for Prime Minister Netanyahu, former Minister of Defense Gallant and head of Hamas military wing Mohammed Deif (presumed dead). ICC spokesperson asserted that the warrants were issued due to failure of Israel’s own judicial system to look into the allegations of war crimes. The immediate impact of this development is the announcement of many of Israel’s key European allies - including the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Finland and Portugal - that Prime Minister Netanyahu would be arrested on their territory. Canada and South Africa have also confirmed that they would implement the arrest warrants. Other countries, including France, Germany, and the UK, have been more ambiguous in whether or not they would comply, and the US and Hungary have announced defiance of the ICC decision. The decision is perhaps the most concrete indication to date of widespread international opposition to the way in which the Israeli government has run the war in Gaza, where the humanitarian situation continues to be dire and civilian casualties in the ongoing fighting remain high.

Palestinian writer Mohammed Daraghmeh asserts that the ICC arrest warrants have potential to impact the direction of the conflict. He believes that the arrest warrants are potentially the first of many to be issued over the war in Gaza. Moreover, “this procedure could be followed by similar ones against settlement building in the West Bank, which the charter of the court defines as war crimes.” Daraghmeh also notes that the ICC decision is part of a broader international process pressuring Israel by threatening it with “pariah state” status over its policies in Gaza and the West Bank.

Annexation Legislation

This month, a legal amendment that moves control over antiquities sites in the West Bank from the Civil Administration to the Israel Antiquities Authority was advanced in Knesset. The legal transfer of authority from a military body to a civilian one in the territories is another step towards de jure annexation. Peace Now reports that the prevalence of antiquities sites throughout the West Bank means that the Israel Antiquities Authority would be involved “in virtually all construction and development work in Area C of the West Bank,” including monitoring and enforcement in cases of damage to sites as well as construction approvals. The blurring of lines between military and civilian authorities in the West Bank has escalated significantly under the current Israeli administration, such that the differentiation between de facto and de jure annexation is no longer clear.

In policy news, new Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz banned the use of administrative detention for Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The policy was used against suspects in cases of Jewish terror against Palestinians. The use of administrative detention against Palestinians in the West Bank continues.

The Israeli legislature parameter drops from 2.0 to 1.5. Israeli law in the West Bank drops from 1.5 to 1.0.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

Think we missed something this month? Send us tips and comments here.

Advertisement

This message was sent byTwo-State Index, H.L. Education for Peace, Geneva Initiative, 33 Jabotinsky rd., Ramat-Gan 525108, Israel, 03-693-8780
You may notify us, any time, for no charge, of your refusal to receive advertisements by sending a refusal message to the address [email protected]
or by pressing the "unsubscribe" link at the bottom of the message.