The Election's Winner: Ending or Escalating the War

Ending or Escalating the War

This month marked a year since the Hamas attacks on October 7th and the launch of the war in Gaza. Despite vaunted IDF military achievements, in particular the killing of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah and Yahya Sinwar of Hamas, the absence of an exit strategy for Israeli forces from Gaza or Lebanon or clear endgame goals prevent the military measures from being translated into any significant achievements that promise long-term stability for Israelis or Palestinians. 

While there are signs of a possible ceasefire approaching for the fighting in Lebanon, the Israeli government has signaled its intentions to continue the war in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu is likely to wait for US election results in order to leverage ceasefire progress – which both presidential candidates have called for – towards his government’s interests. The next American president will be critical in shaping not only an immediate end of the fighting in Gaza, but the course of the conflict and the region over the coming year.

The Two-State Index drops by 0.8% this month, from 5.0 to 4.96.

International Red Lines and American Elections

State and Defense Secretaries Blinken-Austen sent a letter notifying Israel of consequences for restricted weapons sales if aid is not allowed into the northern part of the Gaza Strip, where the humanitarian situation is particularly dire at the moment. The US administration has been slow to exercise leverage on issues related to weapons supply, despite the many public disagreements with the Israeli government regarding strategy and management of the war in Gaza. The letter is indicative of significantly frayed relations.

Spokesperson Matthew Miller explained that there are “provisions under U.S. law that require us to make certain certifications. And to make those certifications, we have to see that Israel is not arbitrarily denying humanitarian assistance making it into Gaza.” This explanation is similar to the one used by Israel’s close allies the United Kingdom and Germany in their own recent reviews and restrictions of weapons sales to Israel. Towards the end of the month, Miller noted that the necessary aid and issues raised in the letter had not been sufficiently addressed.

From the perspective of Gazans like journalist Nour Swerki, the dire nature of the situation in the northern Strip is part of the Israeli government’s strategy: “Israel has started a new war in northern Gaza again, using starvation, mass destruction and killing to force people to the south in order to empty this part of the small overcrowded Strip and make it a buffer zone.”

Other developments this month also highlight both the importance and limitations on US influence: Analysts attributed the limited nature of Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian targets in late October as a result of Biden administration pressure (the linkage was denied by the Israeli PMO). However, US concern regarding Israeli legislation to ban UNRWA was not effective (see the section on Israeli legislation below).

The most impactful development for the war in the foreseeable short-term future, and for the longer term direction that Israelis and Palestinians take if and when a ceasefire is achieved, will be United States elections on November 5th. 

Both the Democratic and Republican candidates are likely to push for a quick end to the war, having signaled as much during their campaigns. VP Kamala Harris has repeatedly called for a hostage-ceasefire deal, while former President Trump has also iterated on multiple occasions the need for Israel to “get it over with” in terms of ending the war in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu has a history of public opposition to the requests and policy priorities of recent democratic presidents, framing himself to his political base as a strong and independent leader who can resist the pressure of Israel’s key ally under both Obama and Biden administrations. There were no shows of public opposition under the Trump presidency, either due to American policies that sat well with Netanyahu’s right-wing base or because the Republican President’s premium on loyalty and unquestioning support made such opposition too risky.

Beyond the timing and conditions of a ceasefire in Gaza, the next US president is likely to be a central actor in the crossroads regarding the future of the two-state solution. Far-right discourse within Israel is growing more strident regarding resettlement of the Gaza Strip, with high-profile members of the Likud party attending an October conference advocating for resettlement on the border with Gaza and calling publicly for Palestinian population transfers. At the same time, moves towards de facto annexation by this government in the West Bank have accelerated significantly in terms of infrastructure, building approvals, and even legal framings. A Harris presidency is likely to set extreme consequences for moves towards annexation of any of the territories, whereas many on the Israeli right see Trump as a potential ally in this regard. On the other hand, Trump’s running mate and his own foreign policy history point to trends of isolationism and reluctance to become military involved in overseas wars, while Harris embraces Biden’s legacy of multilateralism and strong positions on the Russia-Ukraine war. Whatever the results, the consequences for the next year of the conflict are certain to be significant.

In the interim period between elections and assumption of office, there has historically been a potential for dramatic steps related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the two-state solution. This is more likely than ever for President Biden, who will be unable to advance any significant domestic agenda measures and will be looking to secure his foreign policy legacy at the end of his term. This likely played into the considerations driving the Knesset vote on October 28th against the establishment of any new foreign consulates in Jerusalem, something the Biden administration promised in the past but has made no significant moves towards during this presidential term.

The United States is not the only player undergoing a significant leadership change in the near future. Top EU diplomat Josep Borrell has been replaced as of November 1st by former Estonian PM Kaja Kallas. Borrell’s tenure as High Representative was marked by frequent and sharp criticism of Israel, especially conduct of the war in Gaza. This led to public clashes with Israeli government officials. Kallas’s focus is primarily on the Russia/Ukraine war, but her positions and statements on Israel and Gaza have emphasized both Israel’s right to defend itself and obligation to comply with international law. On the one hand, Kallas is not perceived by Israelis as carrying the same pro-Palestinian (generally conflated with anti-Israel) positions as her predecessor, which could give leverage for more effective EU interventions and influence. On the other, she is also not expected to spend the same amount of time and energy on the Middle East as Borrell did.

In other international moves highlighting growing frustration with the continuation and extension of the war into new areas, the UK extended additional sanctions this month to four far-right settler organizations (including Amana) as well as three settler outposts in the West Bank. Spain froze arms purchases and sales to Israel, and the President of France called for an arms embargo against Israel and has banned Israeli companies from participating at a Parisian arms fair in November.

The United States parameter moves from 9.0 to 8.0 this month.

Palestinian Leadership Vacuums and Power Plays 

Yahya Sinwar was killed in a firefight with IDF soldiers earlier in the month. Long seen as one of the most extreme figures within Hamas as well as a central architect of the October 7th attacks, his death opens up questions about future leadership in Hamas as well as the flexibility of positions regarding a hostage-ceasefire deal.

Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh notes that the most important consequences of the leadership change will only be observed after a ceasefire: “The impact of the absence of Sinwar on Hamas will be seen after the war, when a political leadership replaces the military leadership that Sinwar represented.”  The choice of replacement will impact, among other factors, the likelihood of future reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, and the creation of a reunited Palestinian leadership representative of both Gaza and the West Bank.

In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has run a crackdown on militants in the northern city of Tubas, to shore up their control of the area against the rise of Hamas and PIJ in the north. The intervention is motivated by multiple factors: the need for the PA to reassert its effectiveness and security control in the north; a step to deescalate military tensions with Israel, by potentially preempting another raid by the IDF; and proof that the Palestinian Authority has the capacity to eventually create a stable and secure local government in the Gaza Strip. 

A Palestinian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, indicated that fears of a second Gaza in the West Bank play a significant role in the PA's attempt to exert security stability and control: “Tobas is a pilot for ending the military phenomenon in the West Bank. We have succeeded in Tobas and Nablus. We are making significant progress in Tolkarem and we are doing our best to achieve the same in Jenin. We want to spare our people in the West Bank the death and destruction that our people in Gaza have been through since October 7.”

Despite the push to reassert Palestinian security control in the north, the spiking number of attacks in the last month alone (West Bank Palestinians attacking Israeli civilians in Jaffa, an IDF soldier shooting a Palestinian woman harvesting olives, ongoing IDF operations in the West Bank). According to OCHA figures, between the start of the war through 21 October 2024, 732 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Over 42,000 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip, according to Hamas-run Ministry of Health statistics. 1747 Israelis have been killed since the start of the war on October 7th.

Meanwhile, talks have resumed in Doha over a hostage-ceasefire deal, although with less media coverage and more cautious signaling over expectations than some previous iterations.

Daraghmeh says, “In private talks with mediators, Hamas has made it clear that their number one priority is ending the war, not releasing prisoners in return for hostages. Hostages is the only card in Hamas’s hand to press for ending the war, therefore I can’t see them releasing any before having assurances for ending the war.”

Official Israeli-Palestinian engagement rises from 2.0 to 2.5 due to revived hostage-ceasefire negotiation discussions. IDF Military actions in the West Bank rise from 8.5 to 9.0. Governance in Gaza goes from 2.0 to 1.0.

Israeli Legislation on the Conflict

As the Knesset reconvened following the summer break, local and international attention focused on the two bills aimed at cutting any Israeli institutional ties with UNRWA. These became law on the 28th of October and will go into effect in 90 days. Many experts on humanitarian aid and the unique Palestinian refugee frameworks assert that this is too little time for an effective transfer of services and responsibilities to a different organization, even if an alternative was clearly lined up and willing to take on the daunting task (which, at the moment, there is not).

Israel Policy Forum policy advisor Jess Manville notes: “You can find a composition of various different UN agencies and other organizations that can take on some of the functions of UNRWA. But ultimately, because UNRWA is a direct service provider, it’s difficult to find organizations with the resources and staff capable of providing all of these services.”

Manville points out that while in Gaza there are many agencies and organizations that may be willing and able to shoulder some of the burden of humanitarian relief, that calculus will change when relief shifts to reconstruction. In East Jerusalem and the West Bank, where UNRWA services cover so many basic state services, the impact is likely to be immediate and severe. Of the three options for shouldering UNRWA responsibilities in these areas – Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and international agencies – the first and last have little desire and limited capacity to do so.

“This could be an opening for the international community to strengthen the Palestinian Authority,” Manville explains. “If they rally behind the PA to take over UNRWA services, and funding is redirected there, while also at the same time stating that Palestinian refugee rights are enshrined in international law and that the issue will be decided in a final status agreement. Obviously there are problems with this, but it could ultimately strengthen the PA and Palestinian statehood.”

Minister of Finance Smotrich agreed to extend the waiver permitting Israeli and Palestinian banks to cooperate for one more month. This ensures that the issue, and all of the uncertainty it entails for the Palestinian economy, will resurface in the near future.

The Israeli government parameter decreases from 1.5 to 1.0 this month.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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