The Rising Price of No Deal

The Rising Price of No Deal

In the past few days alone, developments in Gaza and the West Bank highlight the horrific cost of continued hostilities, with indications that the situation could deteriorate significantly in the near future. August has also brought new information about public opinion, signs of the Palestinian Authority’s intention for post-war involvement in Gaza and intensified international and local attention to developments in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While the current headlines emphasize death and violence, events and trends passing under the radar point to opportunities for a different reality.

The Two-State Index drops by 0.4% in August, from 5.03 to 5.01.

West Bank Rising in Violence and News Coverage

In the last few days, two car bombs in the Gush Etzion area and a shooting close to Hebron which resulted in three Israeli policemen killed are the latest in the spiraling escalation throughout the West Bank. The attacks follow a large-scale IDF operation in the northern West Bank and unbridled settler violence documented in the towns of Jit, Rujeib, Susiya, and Bethlehem. Four were arrested in connection with the Jit attack, which received Israeli news coverage and condemnation by Israeli leadership, including Prime Minister Netanyahu. A group of Arab women with Israeli citizenship driving through the West Bank were also attacked by settlers, an incident that sparked coverage and outrage within Israel.

Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh asserts that “the Israeli government is using the war in Gaza as a smoke cloud to cover the rapid settlement expansion, paving the path for annexing West Bank.” However, while previous incidents of violence, settlement expansion, and even legal and bureaucratic changes in the first months of the war passed without extensive coverage, August media and international attention has been more focused, perhaps due to the severity of some of the cases.

With regard to the large-scale IDF operation in the northern West Bank, Daraghmeh points out that “the militant groups have been growing in this part of West Bank since 2022, but significantly increased since October 7.” Journalist Emad Abu Awwad asserts that the situation in the area is a direct result of Israeli policies to undermine the Palestinian Authority, “by closing the path of peaceful negotiations and increasing settlement expansion. That leads to the frustration of the new generation, particularly in the impoverished refugee camps in the northern West Bank.” The PA is perceived as steadily losing control in the north to Islamic Jihad and other radical groups. Over 20 Palestinians have been killed in the IDF operation to date.

The settler violence parameter increases from 9.0 to 9.5 this month.

Regional Tensions, Ceasefire Deal, and the PA’s bid for post-war Gaza

Throughout August, global and regional actors have been engaged in non-stop diplomatic attempts to calm tensions and avert a full-scale war between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah following the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. An intensive but brief rocket exchange on August 25th was framed by both Hezbollah and Israel as a strategic success, and once again stopped short of the regional conflagration that diplomats, officials and media professionals have been predicting. Key interlocutors, including the United States, see a hostage-ceasefire deal as the best and perhaps only means of avoiding a wider regional war, with Iranian officials signaling that they would moderate their response to the Haniyeh assassination if a deal is reached.

However, both Hamas and Israel continue to hold irreconcilable positions regarding the deal, most notably regarding IDF disengagement from Philadelphi Corridor. This intransigence was echoed in the wake of the news that six more Israeli hostages were killed in Gaza, with both sides once again blaming the other for the failure to reach a deal. Reports of a recent Israeli cabinet meeting on the issue quote Defense Minister Yoav Gallant as saying that the cabinet decision to retain Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor is equivalent to giving up on one of Israel’s stated central goals of the war: returning the hostages alive.

During a visit to Turkey this month, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced his intention to visit the Gaza Strip to show solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Such a visit would be symbolic both of Palestinian unity as well as of the PA’s interest in regaining legitimacy and authority in the Gaza Strip. It would, however, require coordination both with Israel and Hamas.

According to Palestinian writer Mohammed Younis, “This demand indicates that the Palestinian Authority is making a new bid to return to Gaza after this devastating war, with the help of the international community.”

Given the political, security, and bureaucratic obstacles to such a visit, the demand is likely to remain at the symbolic and aspirational level, according to former Head of the Civil Administration in the West Bank Brig. Gen. (ret.) Ilan Paz. There are three possible ways for Abbas to visit the Strip: a direct helicopter flight between Jordan and Gaza, through Egypt and the Rafah crossing, or through an Israeli border crossing. "All options would require coordination with Israel," notes Paz, and it is unclear what the security arrangements and interlocutors of such a visit would look like. No date has been set for the trip.

In addition to preventing a broader regional war, the hostage-ceasefire deal is widely seen by international players as the opening for a broader political process that could, over time, restore Palestinian Authority presence and legitimacy in Gaza and thereby offer a viable way forward towards a comprehensive peace process.

The “Official Israeli-Palestinian Engagement” parameter drops from 2.5 to 2.0 this month, as discussions towards a hostage-ceasefire deal stagnate.

What Status Quo?

This month, hard-right Minister Itamar Ben Gvir accompanied a group of Israeli Jews who were recorded bowing in the Temple Mount/Al Aqsa compound on a religious fast day in the presence of apathetic police, and announced to the press that “our policy is to allow prayer.” This is an explicit violation of the status quo, and forced the Prime Minister’s office to issue a denial. Later in the month, Ben Gvir doubled down that allowing Jewish prayer is now policy. He acknowledged some restrictions on the subject, noting that “if I could do what I wanted,” he would to build a synagogue on Al Aqsa, causing a round of condemnations from the Arab world and another routine denial of any change to the status quo by the Prime Minister’s office. Opposition MKs used the event to point out Netanyahu’s lack of control over his most extreme coalition partners.

Terrestrial Jerusalem founder Daniel Seidemann notes that the phenomenon of Jewish prayer at the site is old news, but Ben Gvir’s attitude and openness have marked a shift: “The status quo has been eroding for years. What began as a wink and a nod to Jewish prayer by police has now become institutionalized and open. That is not new. What is new is how openly this is highlighted by a person in authority.”

Regarding Ben Gvir’s remarks about wanting to build a synagogue on the site, the Jerusalem expert cautions against dismissing the statement as irrelevant, as well as taking it out of any realistic context: “I think building a synagogue there is clearly remote. You need to sift between what’s actually happening, what is hyperbole and what is irresponsible rumor. What makes this issue unique though, is that it alone can trigger a regional war.”

Seidemann is also dismissive of the Prime Minister’s denial of changes to the status quo: “None of this happens without Netanyahu’s knowledge and consent.”

Ben Gvir’s controversial actions and statements also highlighted splits within the coalition itself on the Temple Mount issue, with ultra-Orthodox MK Moshe Gafni implying that they are causing his party to reconsider coalition membership. After the publicized actions of Jewish prayer in the Al Aqsa compound, ultra-Orthodox sources made a rare Arabic-language outreach effort to condemn challenges of the status quo and assert that Jewish ascension to the Temple Mount/Al Aqsa is forbidden from a religious legal standpoint. While there is no real expectation that this issue will cause the coalition to fall apart, it is a clear example of the outsized power of a small, extremist and outlier group in shaping government policy despite the opposition and concerns of the Israeli mainstream.

The ”Jerusalem – Holy sites” parameter drops from 6.0 to 4.5, due to erosion of the Al Aqsa/Temple Mount status quo.

Public Opinion: Gazans against Hamas and Israelis for Pragmatic Solutions

An IDF report late this month asserted that March public opinion poll results by the respected Palestinian polling company PCPSR had been doctored by Hamas to indicate higher levels of support for violence, for the attack on October 7^th, and for Hamas itself among the Gazan public. The report alleges that the true results included only 31% support among Gazans for Hamas’s decision to attack Israel on October 7^th (original reported March result: 71%) and 32% satisfaction with Hamas’s actions in the war (reported result: 62%). The report throws into doubt previous assumptions about Gazans’ high levels of support for Hamas throughout the war, a staple of both Hamas and extreme right-wing Israeli narratives. Pollster Dr. Khalil Shikaki rejected the report, labeling it a “battle over narratives” between the army and Hamas. The IDF report clarified that there was no intentional collusion with Hamas by the PSR center in Ramallah.

A Geneva Initiative poll of Israeli public opinion carried out by the Midgam Institute this month found that a plurality of Israeli society still prefers the two-state solution over any other alternative for ending the conflict: 37.2% prefer two states, showing a slight increase since the last Geneva Initiative poll in January and a continued core of mainstream support, with the competing results of “none of the above” and “don’t know” (together 35.7%) indicating that no other pragmatic solution comes close to the two-state paradigm in terms of public support. A plurality of the Israeli public (39%) also prefers the Biden Plan in terms of a temporary international presence in Gaza, normalization with Saudi Arabia and progress towards a two-state solution instead of indeterminate full Israeli control over Gaza (31%) or Israeli military control with Palestinian civil administration (17%), and a majority (54.1%) agrees that October 7^th and the war in Gaza has increased the urgency of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (36.4% disagree).

The public opinion parameter rises from 4.44 to 4.63 this month.

International Developments

Top EU diplomat Josep Borrell has announced that he will seek EU sanctions against extremist Israeli ministers for hate speech and incitement to war crimes. While the step would require an extremely unlikely unanimous level of support by EU members, it may be followed by individual member states applying sanctions and does signal growing European frustration with the demonstrable influence of hardliner policies and politicians in Israel.

At the Democratic National Convention, presidential candidate Kamala Harris laid out her position regarding the war in Gaza, delineating a mainstream platform similar to that of President Biden’s. Earlier in the month, one of Harris’s top advisors reaffirmed that Harris does not support an arms embargo against Israel, in response to rumors and claims surrounding one of the more controversial issues for the Democratic party at this time.

Israel revoked the diplomatic status of Norwegian diplomats serving at the representative office to the Palestinian Authority. The punitive measure is in response to Norway’s recognition of Palestinian statehood.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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