Targeted Killing of the Status Quo

Status Quo on Trial

As the region braces for an unknown level of escalation, the war continues in Gaza and other fronts, with the death toll rising to more than 39,000 Palestinians and over 1,600 Israelis. Developments from the last week alone included 12 children killed by a Hezbollah rocket in Majdal Shams and deliberate bombing of a water reservoir in Rafah, reminders of the acute vulnerability and suffering of civilians in this conflict.

There were significant legal, political, and on-the-ground developments impacting the Two-State Index this month, including the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the status of Israel’s presence in the territories. The Index increased by 0.4% in July, from 5.01 to 5.03.

ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Occupation

This month, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on the legal status of Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian Territories. The opinion establishes that “Israel’s settlement policy, its acts of annexation, and its related discriminatory legislation and measures” are all in violation of international law. The opinion determines that in addition to the de jure annexation of East Jerusalem, Israel’s policies and measures have also by this time resulted in annexation of Area C. The ICJ rules that Israel has an obligation to end its occupation of the Territories “as rapidly as possible,” cease settlement activity, repeal discriminatory measures, and provide reparations to Palestinians impacted by the acts that the court deems illegal. The Court also stated that the United Nations and all states have a legal obligation not to recognize or aid in maintaining Israel’s continued presence in the Territories.

The ICJ opinion is not binding by any of the mechanisms of international law that necessitate enforcement. That said, it carries weight with many countries around the world and is expected to inform reexaminations of policies and steps by many governments, including some of Israel’s strong allies and economic partners. Legal expert and leading Geneva Initiative member Adv. Talia Sasson divides the possible fallout of the advisory opinion into “official and unofficial consequences.” While she acknowledges that the opinion “seemingly lacks teeth,” Sasson expects that it will be followed by actors demanding a binding and enforceable decision regarding limiting or ending Israel’s occupation on the part of the UN Security Council, as well as deliberations and resolutions in the UN General Assembly.

“It’s possible that the United States will exercise its veto against a Security Council decision,” notes Sasson. However, she cautions Israelis against automatically assuming that the US will veto any UNSC decision, regardless of who sits in the White House when the issue is brought to the Security Council’s attention.

Beyond the UNSC and the UNGA, the opinion may result in more countries recognizing Palestinian statehood, and will likely be followed by legal decisions on the state level that will impact bilateral cooperation with Israel on a range of issues, including weapons shipments and military aid. The opinion may influence other international legal processes, such as state actors’ decisions to support or object to the International Criminal Court’s case against Israeli leaders: the new UK government recently withdrew its objection to ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, citing respect for international law. The ICJ opinion is also likely to affect international cooperation in areas like academia, art, and more, as one of the consequences of the de facto annexation noted in the ICJ opinion is difficulty in determining what kind of cooperation may aid or support Israel’s presence in the Territories.

Three of the ICJ judges with a number of reservations from the points brought down in the advisory opinion noted in their explanation that they “regret that the Opinion did not state that both Israel and Palestine are under the obligation to resume without delay the direct permanent status negotiations for the “two-state solution”, based on the negotiation framework defined by the Oslo Accords and the relevant Security Council resolutions.” This is also the primary criticism of the United States against the opinion, as a unilateral move that may serve to undermine a bilateral negotiation process.

Sasson points out that the current political constellation makes the emphasis on enabling negotiations somewhat tenuous: the current Israeli government “isn’t showing a will for reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. It’s showing an uncompromising desire to control the entire territory. The ICJ can’t stop this, and the consequences of the opinion won’t appear overnight. But it does have weight.”

This month, the European Union and United States expanded their list of sanctions against violent settlers (individuals and organizations). Japan and Australia are the latest states to apply new sanctions, in a growing list that adds to snowballing international pressure and lack of confidence regarding Israel’s management of settler violence in the West Bank.

“We’re already experiencing a domino effect of international measures and sanctions,” explains Sasson. “And that’s before states have taken into account the significance of the ICJ opinion.”

The lawfare parameter rises from 7.1 to 8.5 this month, as a result of the ICJ advisory opinion.

US-Israel Relations: Netanyahu Addresses Congress

In late July, Prime Minister Netanyahu traveled to the United States to address both houses of Congress and hold meetings with US leadership. His trip came amidst more optimistic headlines about the likelihood of a hostage-ceasefire deal, despite the slow pace and mixed signals characterizing negotiations. While hostage families tried to garner public pressure and media traction to push the Prime Minister into announcement of a deal in his speech, there was little real expectation that it would materialize. Hamas has accused Netanyahu of torpedoing negotiations by introducing new conditions to the proposed deal. While the Prime Minister’s office denies the allegation, critical statements by Minister of Defense Gallant and other Israeli stakeholders confirm that Netanyahu has made amendments. Up until this point, the US administration has refrained from publicly attributing responsibility to the Israeli government for failure to achieve a deal. If frustration and tensions with Israeli leadership grow high enough, this could change. The future of negotiations is in any case unclear with the extent of the current regional escalation still unknown.

Netanyahu’s Capitol Hill speech mentioned the benefits of a regional front aligned against Iran’s spreading influence. However, the window prior to American elections for clinching a US-brokered normalization detail between Israel and the Saudis has closed, due to Netanyahu’s political incapacity to endorse any possibility of a political process with the Palestinians. His vision for Gaza and for the broader Middle East made no mention of the West Bank or of any plan for Israeli-Palestinian relations more generally. The Saudis and other regional actors have made it clear that without linkage and progress towards Palestinian statehood, there will be no regional involvement in the future of Gaza, despite the fact that senior Israeli security and political officials consider this a critical component of future stability.

In Israel, Netanyahu’s speech was on the whole perceived favorably, as it highlighted justification of both cause and implementation of the war. Criticism focused on the campaigning rather than pragmatic nature of the speech, in that it made no mention of the hostage deal and only briefly mentioned the tens of thousands of Israeli evacuees who continue to be stranded far from their homes.

The speech was boycotted by around half of Congressional Democrats. The presumptive Democratic nominee for president, VP Kamala Harris, was also absent. While her staff insisted that her non-attendance was due to a prior commitment, numerous media sources portrayed it as a further sign of the Vice President’s more openly critical stance of Israel’s prosecution of the war and handling of related humanitarian issues in Gaza.

Harris, Biden, and Republican nominee Donald Trump all met with Netanyahu in the days following. Notably, messaging prior to the meetings from all three was aligned on one central point: a need to bring the war in Gaza swiftly to an end, with Biden and Harris pushing for acceptance of the hostage deal and Trump emphasizing the public relations costs for Israel in drawing out the fighting. Trump also shared a letter on social media from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas condemning the assassination attempt on his life, with his own brief but warm response thanking Abbas and a message to his broader audience reaffirming the conception of himself as arbiter of “peace in the Middle East.”

International parameters remain stable this month.

Palestinian Politics: Unity and Tensions

At a meeting in Beijing, Palestinian factions signed an agreement to form a unity government. The declaration was purportedly a step towards Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. Aside from signaling increased Chinese involvement in Middle East mediation efforts, it also highlighted the significant divide between the mainstream Israeli position, which sees no place for Hamas in post-war governance of the Gaza Strip (let alone the rest of the Palestinian Territories), and the mainstream Palestinian assumption that some kind of unity arrangement will be necessary out of political and pragmatic considerations. No details or timetable were included in the declaration, and the internal political antipathies and obstacles to implementing Palestinian reconciliation remain.

PLO official Ahmad Majdalani is skeptical about the application of the declaration at this time: “I think there will be no opportunity for such a deal to see the light of day before the end of the war in Gaza.” He adds that “both Fatah and Hamas leaders are waiting for the end of the war to determine their role in the day after. Therefore the Beijing declaration would be an exercise for the future after the war, when every political force, whether it be Hamas or President Abbas, see their opportunity.”

“President Abbas didn’t welcome the agreement,” notes Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh. “There is concern about a possible Israeli strong reaction to having a national unity government endorsed by Hamas, even if Hamas is not represented directly in this government.”

Earlier this month, Palestinian Authority President Abbas publicly and explicitly held Hamas responsible for the deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip after Israel’s attack aimed at Hamas military leader Mohammad Deif. PA officials criticized the Hamas tactic of “hiding between the residents,” ensuring high casualties of non-combatants in the ongoing war with Israel.

In the ongoing speculation regarding administration of Gaza after the war, an old name has resurfaced: in the Wall Street Journal and other media sources, Mohammed Dahlan has been floated as an option. With connections in Gaza and Israel, independence from Fatah, and American support, Dahlan is seen as an actor that might be acceptable to all

of the key players outside of the Palestinian Authority. However, Dahlan quickly denied any intention of filling the power vacuum in English and Arabic on social media, rejecting “any choice that has not been reached based on Palestinian national understandings.”

Dr. Sufyan Abu Zayda, a scholar and former minister with close ties to Dahlan, indicates that the issue with the publicity is its implication of a separate Palestinian administration for the West Bank and Gaza: “Mohammed Dahlan made it clear that his priority is having a Palestinian national unity government to run both the West Bank and Gaza the day after,” objecting to any arrangements that might entrench separation between the Gaza Strip and West Bank. “These proposals came from Israel, and they reflect the Israeli plan to undermine any possibility of having the two-state solution in the future by separating Gaza from the West Bank permanently.”

The parameter for Fatah-Hamas relations rises from 3.0 to 3.5 this month, and ties between West Bank & Gaza rise from 6.5 to 7.0.

Annexation Continues

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich continued to exercise his appointees’ expanded authority in the Ministry of Defense this month. On July 18th, Israeli Central Command unilaterally transferred civil administrative powers related to enforcement, planning, and building for 167,000 dunams in Area B from the Palestinian Authority to the Civil Administration under Smotrich, in contravention of the Oslo Accords. Peace Now asserts that the motivation behind the move is to expand Israeli demolishment of Palestinian buildings and homes beyond Area C, into Area B. Sixty-six dunams in the West Bank were declared state land in order to prepare for the formal legalization of the Evyatar outpost. A Knesset bill allowing the Israel Antiquities Authority to work in the West Bank passed a preliminary hearing with coalition support. Once passed, this legislation will further erode differentiation under Israeli law between sovereign Israel and the territories. Meanwhile, the violent confrontations betweenWest Bank Palestinians and Israeli forces continue to result in casualties that are overshadowed by the numbers in Gaza, but contribute to heightened tensions and a sense of hopelessness. Maj. Gen. Yehuda Fuks, the outgoing chief of Israel’s CentralCommand, focused on growing settler violence in his departure speech.

Peace Now’s new report provides a comprehensive list of steps towards accelerated annexation since the start of the war, including outpost construction and legalization, infrastructure expansion, new settlements planned in Hebron and elsewhere, massive budgetary allocations, documented settler violence against Palestinians, and more. While many of these steps have been carried out with relative impunity as international attention has fixated on Gaza and the possibility of regional escalation, the ICJ advisory opinion has already refocused some public attention on the West Bank.

Minister Itamar Ben Gvir visited the Temple Mount/Al Aqsa Compound this month, sparking outrage and condemnation from Arab allies, criticism of irresponsible behavior from coalition partners as well as Knesset opposition, and what has become a repeated refrain from the Prime Minister’s office confirming that the status quo on the holy site persists, despite Ben Gvir’s declarations and actions providing copious evidence to the contrary.

The parameter measuring Israeli law in the West Bank drops from 2 to 1.5 (reverse scale) this month, as a result of the legal steps towards entrenching annexation and erasing any legal differentiation between sovereign Israel and the occupied territories.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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