Annexation in the Wild West Bank

Annexation in the Wild West Bank

This month, significant legal changes in the West Bank were largely obscured by the ongoing war in Gaza, concerns about escalating tensions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, and high-profile diplomatic clashes. Although the transfer of authorities between military and civilian branches can be hard to follow and difficult to explain, the implications affect multiple areas of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the legal status of Israel’s presence in the West Bank, the on-the-ground situation for Palestinian and likelihood of massive settlement expansion, and the state of hope amongst Palestinians and Israelis alike regarding the possibility of a future two-state solution.

As a result of transfer of legal authorities in the West Bank and changes in public opinion, the Two-State Index drops by 3% in June, from 5.16 to 5.01.

Blurred Lines: Annexation

This month, with all eyes on Gaza and, increasingly, on the threat of all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah, extreme right-wing politicians in Israel leveraged the ongoing chaos to make systemic changes to the administration of the West Bank.

Some of the most concerning clauses of the original government coalition agreement were realized in the past weeks, with authority formally transferred from COGAT (a branch of the Israeli military) to a civil administrator within the Ministry of Defense under Minister Bezalel Smotrich. The transferred powers include control of real estate transactions, government property, land and water arrangements, protection of some holy places, forestry laws, tourism, public bathing, planning of cities, villages, and construction, some land registration processes, and management and administration of regional councils.

Lior Amihai, Director of Peace Now with oversight of the organization’s Settlement Watch program, explains that these new authorities can be summarized as control of “everything to do with settlers, lands, and enforcement.” In terms of the on-the-ground consequences, Amihai predicts “many more demolitions of Palestinian construction, retroactive legalizations of outposts, and approvals of many more settlement housing units. All of these things were happening anyways - but now there are basically no systemic limitations that would prevent any of them from happening.”

These changes have immediate and wide-reaching legal significance. The transfer of authority from a military body to a civil servant in a civilian ministry department creates two separate systems for Israeli settlers (civilian control) and Palestinian residents of the West Bank (military control). The addition of legal advisors under the authority of a civilian department compounds the significance. While the military legal advisors continue to be responsible for some issues related to Palestinians and military security while taking into account the constraints of international law, the civilian legal advisors do not operate under the same assumptions and framework.

“This is de jure annexation,” asserts Amihai. “It’s crafted in a way that makes it harder to understand. That’s why the recordings we [Peace Now] published were so important.”

The recordings of Minister Smotrich, covered by the New York Times and other media outlets, contain an explicit explanation that the steps to gain authority within the Ministry of Defense allowed the settlement movement to sidestep the political and legal hurdles to annexation while creating “a separate civil system.”

On June 27th, Netanyahu’s cabinet approved the retroactive legalization of five West Bank outposts, sanctions against PA officials, and the assumption by Israel of enforcement responsibilities in a site within Area B. The last step is in direct violation of the Oslo Accords. These moves against the PA were framed by Minister Smotrich and local media both as ‘retribution’ against the PA for recent moves against Israel in the international arena (recognition of Palestine, the cases in the ICC and ICJ) as well as a compromise in exchange for releasing frozen PA tax funds and extending the waiver that allows Israeli banks to continue working with Palestinian institutions. However, these steps should first and foremost be understood in the context of the new authority that Smotrich and his department-within-a-department have now assumed over settlement issues.

The Israeli Law parameter drops from 5.8 points to 2.0, as a result of changes in Israeli law in the West Bank and legalization of outposts.

Red Lines: Global Positions on the Conflict

Prime Minister Netanyahu aired grievances on social media this month about US delays on weapons shipments. In consequence, a high-level Washington meeting between Israeli and American officials on Iran was cancelled. The events also highlighted recurring tensions within the Israeli cabinet, as Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant emphasized the strategic importance of the relationship and criticizing the way the Prime Minister handled disagreements with the US in the open.

Former Israeli diplomat and international affairs expert Jeremy Issacharoff expressed skepticism at rumors that the Netanyahu-Biden tensions would contribute to American reluctance to stand by Israel in the event of total war with Hezbollah: “If the fighting in Gaza dies down, if [US Senior Advisor Amos] Hochstein can put parameters on the table that keep Hezbollah and Israel from all-out war, that would serve everyone’s purpose. If it does break out, the American position would depend on how it broke out and who is responsible. The US position generally will be very supportive of Israel. The Americans understand very clearly the nature of the Hezbollah threat and who they’re serving, meaning Iran.”

At the same time, Issacharoff is pessimistic about the impact of Netanyahu’s July speech to Congress on Israel-US relations: “There is no higher urgency [for Israel] than putting the American-Israeli strategic partnership back on track. If Netanyahu goes to Congress and lays out a clear plan for getting the hostages out as soon as possible and for achieving a political horizon with the Palestinians, then we could be back on track - for the relationship with the United States, with Europe, with the Saudis, and for how we contend with the major strategic threat for the foreseeable future, namely Iran. At this point, he does not seem to want to do that.”

Canada is the latest country to add sanctions against settler extremists, targeting the Amana movement and settler leader Daniella Weiss. Slovenia and Armenia are the latest countries to recognize the State of Palestine. UK approvals of arms exports to Israel have decreased by 95% since the start of the war, marking a 13-year low in this regard. In France, Israeli companies and delegates were banned from participating in a significant military exhibition due to the war in Gaza. Although the ban was later overturned by a French court, the decision was made after the exhibition had already been launched. Other examples of economic and academic sanctions against Israeli companies, universities, and individuals are accumulating, as international opinion hardens against continued Israeli military activity in Gaza without an exit plan or broader strategy for conflict resolution. Rumors of sanctions considered in sensitive areas, including targeting of higher-level settlement leaders, are being leaked by countries allied to Israel.

The Israeli government’s public strategic response to this increased isolation on the world stage currently consists of the legalization of five West Bank outposts and more sanctions against the PA.

Party Lines: Administration of Gaza

Palestinian internal discourse continues to focus on future control of the Gaza Strip. According to senior analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Hamas officials say that the movement can no longer run Gaza due to the heavy reconstruction burden and humanitarian daily needs of the people. They say that they are open to the idea of having the Palestinian Authority running Gaza based on understandings between them. Hamas has a plan B, in case this option doesn't work, which involves local councils running their communities until a national agreement is reached.” The Palestinian Authority has indicated interest in taking over the administration of reconstruction after the war, in cooperation with international institutions.

The Palestinian plans for the day after assume some level of Hamas involvement in national Palestinian governance structures after the war. Former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, often cited by international experts and officials as a prominent Palestinian pragmatist and statesman, has publicly called for a unity government that incorporates Hamas. On the Israeli side, official and public opinion continue to align strongly against this possibility, but there is no progress towards an alternative arrangement.

The Israeli security forces are showing signs of growing frustration with the expectation that a decisive victory can be achieved through military means alone. This month, IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari publicly offered an implicit rebuke of political leadership, asserting that those making claims about the complete elimination of Hamas – the stated goal of the current government – are “throwing sand in the eyes of the public.”

Daraghmeh notes that “Palestinian officials both in Gaza and the West Bank have ruled out the possibility of having a local administration in Gaza under Israeli control. No one is willing or would dare to cooperate with Israeli authorities.”

Hard Lines: Palestinian Public Opinion

Palestinian pollster Dr. Khalil Shikaki published a new public opinion poll showing trends and positions in the West Bank and Gaza related to war, violence, negotiations, and the desired end to the conflict. The poll results show a plurality of support for Hamas (40%) and majority support for armed struggle as the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state.

In a briefing to Geneva Initiative staff and Israeli journalists participating in a GI policy training program, Dr. Shikaki pointed out that despite the rising support for Hamas, Marwan Barghouti (Fatah) continues to be the most popular candidate among all presidential candidates, outstripping Haniyyeh and Abbas consistently in the polls. He also unpacked the shift in support for non-violent means of ending the conflict over time. In September 2022, a majority of Palestinians supported negotiations or non-violent resistance as the best means of achieving Palestinian national goals (54%, with 41% supporting armed struggle). One year later under the Netanyahu government, this trend had flipped. Dr. Shikaki argued that the trend remains reversible, if a real political horizon should develop.

According to the PSR poll, support for the two-state solution among the Palestinian public stands at 32% in June, similar to pre-war levels. Another poll conducted in June by the Institute for Social and Economic Progress found that less than 5% of Gazans prefer Hamas rule at the end of the war, and 70% of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank would be willing to accept a two-state solution. The different results between the Institute and PSR is due both to framing, as well as difficulties in conducting polling in the OPT today (particularly in the Gaza Strip, due to the war and ongoing mass displacement).

The Political and Public Arena parameters drop from 5.97 to 5.66 this month, with negative trends in public opinion and discourse regarding the two-state solution.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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