Global Interest Vs Political Pressure

Gaza

Talks for a hostage-prisoner swap restarted in May and accelerated in recent days with a public effort by US President Biden to make the sides agree upon a three-part process including hostage and prisoner exchange, withdrawal of IDF forces from populated areas, increased humanitarian aid, and eventual permanent “cessation of hostilities” and reconstruction of Gaza. While the proposal on the table is itself an Israeli one, the fundamental positions of the Israeli government and Hamas seem incompatible. The most difficult issue currently concerns the transition between the first six-week phase and the second phase (release of all remaining hostages and full IDF withdrawal). Given political pressures and his own statements regarding the war, Netanyahu would prefer to renew the fighting following release of the "humanitarian” category of hostages, which does not include male soldiers. Hamas is only prepared to accept a deal that ensures the end of the war. Biden is leaning towards the latter position as a means of reaching the “day after” and all of the political opportunities it entails. As these opportunities are largely political threats from Netanyahu’s perspective, the proposal on the table is a source of further tension between the White House and Jerusalem.

Hard-line Israeli ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir have announced their intention to dissolve the government if such a deal moves forward, while centrist Benny Gantz has indicated his support for the deal. Hamas has released a statement confirming an initial positive reaction to the proposal, as long as the Israeli government “clearly announces commitment to such deal.”

Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh notes that terms like “sustainable calm” (as opposed to “ceasefire”) have been used in the negotiation process as an attempt to overcome the fundamental differences in the Israeli and Hamas positions. “Hamas knows that entering into a ‘sustainable calm’ will not stop Israeli forces from attacking its leaders and any attempts to rebuild their military capabilities, but they have accepted it because it implies an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and an end to the massive bombing.”

Daraghmeh is hopeful that the current negotiations mark a turning point: “We are in front of a historical moment, with Hamas and many of the Israeli security establishment and war cabinet leaders welcoming the roadmap proposed by the American President. I think the end of this war is coming soon, as the Americans are pushing all of the involved parties to stop it and start healing the deep wounds of Gaza.”

Local and international attention turned to Rafah this month, as the IDF began operations in what was previously defined as a safe zone for civilians. Israel took over the Rafah crossing in the first weeks and has since taken full control of the Philadelphi Corridor. This means that the State of Israel is currently the responsible party for all movement across the entirety of the Gazan border, increasing its legal responsibility on issues like humanitarian aid transfers.

Towards the end of the month, an Israeli airstrike resulted in dozens of deaths and shocking images of civilian casualties in a displaced persons camp. International condemnations and calls for a ceasefire poured in immediately. The videos and pictures of the violence also made their way into Israeli media, with an outpouring of condemnation and horror rarely seen since the beginning of the war (alongside, and in response to, prominent right-wing voices celebrating the destruction).

The Official Israeli-Palestinian Engagement moves from 1.5 to 2.5 this month, due to the new Israeli proposal for a hostage-prisoner exchange and ceasefire and the horizon it could open in terms of progress towards broader negotiations. As a result of Hamas’s damaged military capabilities, the Palestinian Attacks (Gaza) parameter decreases from 10 to 8 this month.

Israel

Internal political rifts in Israeli leadership have come more sharply to the surface this month, beyond disagreement regarding the latest hostage-ceasefire proposal. Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant called for the development of a Palestinian administrative alternative to Hamas and Israeli military control of the Gaza Strip. Gallant asserted that the de facto situation on the ground of Israeli military and administrative control of the Strip “is a bad and dangerous alternative for the State of Israel, strategically, security-wise, and militarily.”

While this is not the first time that Gallant and Netanyahu have displayed fundamental public differences on issues of national significance, criticism from the right for lack of political preparation in the ongoing conflict does mark a departure from the unified messaging earlier in the year. Gallant’s remarks also sparked similar criticism soon afterwards from centrist head of the National Unity party Benny Gantz, and more recent condemnations of the government’s failure to achieve basic objectives by cabinet minister Gadi Eisenkot. While the actual principles of Gantz’s own proposal for the future of the Gaza Strip were extremely similar to the general outline that Netanyahu published in March, these speeches point to growing political fissures and widespread dissatisfaction among center and center-right politicians - particularly those from a military background - regarding the lack of a long-term strategy at this time. Gantz set a deadline of June 8^th for his concerns to be addressed, and threatened to leave the government otherwise.

Head of the opposition MK Yair Lapid has also been outspoken this month regarding the need to reinstate the Palestinian Authority as the administrator of the Gaza Strip, explicitly calling for progress in Saudi negotiations conditioned upon discussion of a Palestinian state.

The volume and focus of these political figures’ criticism of Netanyahu coincides with some significant shifts in Israeli public opinion this month. Tel Aviv University’s May 2024 Peace Index found that a majority of Israelis - including a majority within the Jewish sample - prioritizes the release of the hostages by any means over the elimination of Hamas, for the first time since the start of the war. A strong majority at 63% of Israelis believes that the government lacks clear goals in the current war, a message echoed by Gallant and Gantz.

Without a clear 'day after' approach and no broader strategic gains that can be achieved from the current military approach, alongside ongoing casualties and increased international pressure, the split in both public opinion and political leadership can be expected to grow.

As a result of public officials demanding a plan for the day after (including the Palestinian Authority), Israeli Public Discourse rises from 6 to 6.5 this month.

West Bank

Developments in the West Bank indicate that another front is opening up in the war, with potential to mirror the north of Israel and Gaza in levels of instability. IDF incursions into Jenin and other Palestinian population centers resulted in documented civilian casualties and heightened tensions within the territories. Taking into account the ongoing limitation of Palestinian work permits into Israel and the impact on the West Bank economy, the increased restrictions on Palestinian movement in terms of closures and road blocks, and the public identification with Palestinian suffering in Gaza, the territories are being easily drawn in to the broader cycle of violence.

In response to three European countries’ declared intention to unilaterally recognize the State of Palestine (see analysis below), far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has taken further steps to withhold taxes from the Palestinian Authority and is threatening to cut all ties between Israeli and Palestinian banks.

Palestinian analyst Moayad Afaneh notes that these financial measures will “put the Palestinian Authority at serious risk. Israel has withheld 6 billion shekels from Palestinian Authority tax revenues since 2019 until now, causing a severe budget deficit. The Israeli Minister of Finance’s decision to withhold the entire tax revenue, which constitutes two thirds of Palestinian government revenues, threatens to lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. How can a policeman do his job when he doesn’t receive wages and can’t buy food for his family?”

In further steps perceived as punitive or provocative responses to the unilateral recognition move, Minister Gallant signed an order allowing Israeli visits to three of the West Bank settlements evacuated in the 2005 Disengagement legislation. Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir visited the Temple Mount for the first time since the start of the war, and explicitly connected his decision to attend the site to the moves towards recognition of Palestine.

As the Israeli government tightens its grip on the West Bank and East Jerusalem through military, civilian and symbolic means, the international arena - in particular, international legal institutions - grows more and more censorious of Israel’s management of the conflict.

Economic Stability in the West Bank decreases from 3 to 2.5 this month.

International

This month saw several major developments in terms of international involvement in the conflict. The International Court of Justice released an interim order demanding that Israel “immediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate, which may inflict not he Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” The International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC filed applications for arrest warrants of the three senior Hamas leaders as well as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant. Norway, Ireland, and Spain moved towards the recognition of the State of Palestine.

In an opinion piece in Haaretz, Geneva Initiative Deputy Director Tehila Wenger notes that “the carrots floated in front of the parties for the past few years are quickly turning into sticks” as the international community loses patience with the volatility and high cost of the conflict. The more entrenched the Israeli government becomes in refusing to contemplate a two-state solution, she writes, the more the international community will take unilateral or even punitive action, thereby “increasing the likelihood that future Israeli governments will find themselves at the negotiating table facing radicalized Palestinian leadership, without the international support so critical to a strong negotiating position.”

Palestinian Authority Negotiations Department official Dr. Shaddad Attili welcomed the recognition of Palestine as a step that “came late but in the right direction. It represents a kind of damage control to the failed process of Oslo.” Dr. Atitili called for more moves along the same lines: “In light of the ongoing collapse of the two state solution, this is what can be done by the international community: recognizing Palestine and sending messages to the Israelis that the two state solution is the only solution that the world supports and works towards.”

Israeli officials, as well as centrist and center-left politicians, condemned all of these international developments as biased or diplomatic victories for Hamas. In addition to the measures taken by Gallant, Smotrich, and Ben Gvir above, Foreign Minister Israel Katz also ordered the Spanish consulate in Jerusalem to sever ties with Ramallah.

Ireland’s Ambassador to Israel Sonya McGuinness published an op-ed in Haaretz this month directly addressing Israeli fears and negative perceptions of unilateral recognition: “Recognition of a Palestinian state is not a reward for terror – it is the opposite,” she writes. “It is an endorsement of a vision of Palestinian self-determination in which a free and independent Palestine accepts both the rights and the duties of a state.” The Ambassador argues that a two-state solution is key to achieving all of Israel’s primary interests, including regional normalization.

Meanwhile, there is greater pessimism regarding a future role for Israel in a US-Saudi deal. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly expressed doubt that Israel could move forward with a normalization deal given the Saudi condition of progress towards a Palestinian state.

Gulf States expert Dr. Michal Yaari notes that failed normalization could lead to two different scenarios: “Before the war, the United States knew it would be very difficult for the Saudis to market the Israel component of an agreement, but the significant offer from the US made it worthwhile. However, if Israel can’t even discuss the basic principles of a political agreement with the Palestinians, there won’t be any normalization. That could mean a more modest American offer to the Saudis, without an Israel component. Or it could mean a non-starter, because it’s difficult to see Congress approving a Saudi civil nuclear program and defense deal without any Israel peace agreement.”

“Today, the Israeli government’s behavior mirrors the most extreme right voices within the coalition and makes it extremely unlikely that there will be a deal. It’s not that a new government would immediately accept and advance a Palestinian state. But the approach would be different. A government that tells the US government, Arab world and Israeli public that they’re not ready for a Palestinian state but understand that this deal matters, and will therefore move forward towards a political process in full cooperation with Arab actors like Saudi Arabia and the United States, would make a difference. It’s not either-or in terms of a completely different position on a Palestinian state. But the approach matters.”

As the international community introduces new and impactful mechanisms of pressure and leverage, the main question is whether local political constellations on the Israeli and Palestinian sides will adapt in a manner that increases the likelihood of a renewed peace process, or entrench and empower extremist actors and positions that deepen the ongoing loss of life and instability.

As a result of developments in the international arena, the International Actors parameter rises from 8.79 to 8.92.