A Growing Consensus in a Divided Reality

Crossroads in Diplomacy: Emerging International Consensus

March has witnessed rapid developments on the ground, in the streets and within the international arena. While the extreme humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the breakdown of talks in Doha have exacerbated the situation, they have also magnified the urgent need for long-term frameworks to address the conflict and prevent any repetition of the recent and ongoing horrific events. International actors, particularly allies with close ties to Israel, have formed a united front in demanding both immediate humanitarian intervention efforts in Gaza as well as steps towards a political horizon.

This month’s Two State Index will examine:

The breakdown of negotiations in Doha;
Emerging consensus positions in the international community regarding short and long-term frameworks in the conflict;
Changes in Palestinian public opinion and a spike in Israeli protest numbers.

As a result of parameter changes analyzed below, the Two-State Index increases slightly from 5.15 to 5.17 (+0.3%) this month.

Negotiations Stalemate

This month has been punctuated by mixed updates regarding the progress of negotiations to free Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and a ceasefire, temporary or otherwise, with many of the messages cautioning against expectations of a quick breakthrough. On March 26th, Hamas rejected the most recent compromise proposal and doubled down on its demand for a ceasefire that includes IDF redeployment as a condition for any hostage release. This is in addition to the return of displaced Gazans to the northern part of the Strip and release of high-security Palestinian prisoners. Israel recalled its delegation from Doha and, in addition to holding Hamas responsible for the stalemate in talks, Prime Minister Netanyahu and other officials asserted that the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2728 had created the impression that time and international pressure will play to Hamas’s advantage. Although a new Israeli delegation has reportedly been green lighted to resume indirect negotiations with Hamas, the breakdown of talks makes it much less likely that the month of Ramadan will include the achievement of two of the most urgent goals for the Israeli and Palestinian publics - the return of Israeli hostages and a ceasefire that would allow for a significant humanitarian aid response to the catastrophic famine conditions in the Strip.

Nidal Foqaha, Director of the Palestinian Peace Coalition, notes that the starting positions of the sides remain irreconcilable: “The fact that Israel does not accept a complete cessation of military operations doesn’t constitute any incentive for Hamas to go for a deal to release abductees and an interim ceasefire. Hamas is fully concerned with the second round of fighting. Their future as a movement will be seriously threatened if there’s another round and they no longer have a sufficient number of abductees. For Israel, the issue is the release of a significant number of Palestinian prisoners, including heavyweight prisoners with life sentences. It seems that no one is capable of standing up for and selling such a deal.”

Any Israeli agreement to a permanent ceasefire, let alone withdrawal of IDF forces, has been framed by Netanyahu and other government officials as a failure of one of the central goals of the war: completely uprooting Hamas from the Gaza Strip. However, as evidenced in the unfolding chaos regarding aid convoy security, there is currently no local administrative or security alternative to Hamas. Netanyahu has rejected the possibility of reinstating the Palestinian Authority in Gaza as part of a broader political process, and the proposal of replacing Hamas with local Palestinian clans is by most accounts unrealistic. The family clans in Gaza do not have the control or political legitimacy to meet the challenge and are largely aligned with either Hamas or Fatah in any case. Many have publicly declared their unwillingness to run the Strip independently of these movements.

Rafah-based journalist Adel Zanoun notes, “Hamas is deeply rooted in Gaza and there is no way on earth that anyone else can run Gaza, either in the day after or now, under Israeli control. Even the Palestinian Authority needs to have a clear deal with Hamas in order to run Gaza.”

In the absence of local Palestinian actors with the desire or ability to maintain order, the IDF is the primary nexus of control in Gaza, despite Israeli security officials’ opposition. Currently, the two possibilities for administration of Gaza are indefinite Israeli military control or a return to Hamas rule. The failure to bolster an alternative entity to run the Gaza Strip is in direct contravention of Israel’s self-stated central goal in the war. Without a long-term plan for a political process or progress in ceasefire negotiations, Israel’s priorities of removing Hamas and returning the hostages are both far from reach.

With the recent breakdown in negotiations, focus is centered on Rafah, hosting a population crush of over one million Gazans following mass displacement from the north and center. Israeli officials maintain that an invasion of Rafah, accompanied by as yet unspecified measures to protect Gazan civilian lives, is the only way to destroy one of the last remaining Hamas strongholds. Key international actors and allies, however, including the US administration, have made their opposition to a Rafah operation and the likely impact on the civilian population clear. This point of contention, among others, has led to increasingly public disagreements between the Israeli government and some of its closest allies. To date, the level of international pressure has delayed a Rafah invasion, despite comments by Israeli officials throughout the month that such a step was imminent and critical.

The Official Israeli-Palestinian Engagement parameter decreases from 2.5 to 1.5 this month, due to the breakdown of negotiations in Doha.

International Pressure

International pressure towards increasing humanitarian aid in Gaza, reaching a hostage-ceasefire deal and preventing a large-scale Israeli military intervention in Rafah reached new levels in March. This included a marked shift in rhetoric from the US administration, with officials differentiating between the Israeli people - for whom ranking American stakeholders on both sides of the aisle continue to express solidarity - and the Israeli government. The personal and policy-related rifts between the Israeli Prime Minister and US President Biden have become increasingly public; Vice President Harris voiced opposition to an Israeli invasion of Rafah and implied openness to “consequences”; and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer called for Israeli elections to replace the current government while rejecting Netanyahu’s request to address Senate Democrats.

Notably, former President Donald Trump also showed a lack of support for the Israeli government’s policy positions in a recent interview, calling on Israel to “finish up” the war and "go for peace." Trump’s comments indicate that Netanyahu can’t count on unconditional US support in the event of a Republican victory in November, particularly in light of his damaged personal relationship with the Republican front-runner.

Europe is also taking an increasingly active and united stance on the conflict, with the European Union making its first consensus call for an immediate humanitarian pause to the fighting in Gaza. Earlier EU draft declarations were vetoed, primarily by Hungary, and significant efforts were made to reach a consensus position. Given the general sensitivity and wide divisions between different EU member states on most issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this EU declaration shows the extent to which news of the unraveling humanitarian crisis in Gaza has united international positions. The EU also condemned Minister Smotrich’s announcement regarding classification of 800 hectares of land in the Jordan Valley as Israeli state land, calling the move counterproductive to the two-state solution and to Israel’s security. In addition, four European states - Malta, Ireland, Slovenia, and Spain - are currently considering recognition of a state of Palestine, with timing and impact as the most significant factors.

The intensifying concern over Gaza from major world powers came to a head late in the month, when the US abstained from vetoing UNSCR 2728. The resolution calls for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the immediate, unconditional release of hostages. This was the fifth resolution introduced to the UN Security Council and the only one to date that has not been vetoed by one of the permanent members. In response, Netanyahu canceled the upcoming visit of two of his closest aides to Washington for discussions about Rafah and accused the UN of sabotaging negotiations by strengthening Hamas hopes for a permanent ceasefire. While the delegation was rescheduled shortly afterwards, the move pointed to a new level of extremely public tension between the allies.

Colette Avital, former Israeli Consul General in New York City, asserts that “what the Israeli government is doing now is not a simple dispute with President Biden. It is endangering Israel’s basic security. The relations between Israel and the US are without historical precedent, in terms of a relationship between a superpower and a small state. The nature of the relationship surpasses any kind of diplomatic or financial help to Israel.” Recent steps by the Netanyahu government, she argues, are a serious blow to that relationship, and therefore to Israel’s fundamental security.

The developments of this month show a growing consensus across countries, international bodies and different political factions regarding the need for a ceasefire and concrete steps towards a two-state solution. In recent years, local officials and media tend to label European positions as more critical of Israel and sympathetic to Palestinian concerns, while the US was generally perceived in the opposite light. The last few months have seen a strong alignment in views and policies, with sanctions against violent settlers, calls and efforts for the return of the hostages, growing criticism of the Israeli government’s management of the war, and support for an immediate humanitarian pause.

Avital notes that the fundamental rift between the Israeli government and the US administration is about the future:

“The sticking point, the most important part that the United States is asking is something we should have answered long ago: What is the strategy? What is the plan for the ‘day after’? We cannot afford to wait anymore.”

At the same time, she points out the limitations of international involvement and pressure:

“It would be counterproductive if anyone from the outside tries to force us into a political agreement. However, the US President is under extreme pressure from elements within the administration and the Democratic Party. People don’t even begin to understand the incredible aid that we are receiving from President Biden under these circumstances, who continues to differentiate between the Israeli government and the people that he loves."

Meanwhile, there are reports of discussions aimed at developing a concrete plan for the “day after” in Gaza between the US and Arab states. According to journalist Mohammad Daraghmeh, “Six Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia have forged a new peace initiative based on creating a pathway to Palestinian statehood. The plan has already been presented to the US Administration and constitutes a historic opportunity for a lasting peace deal. It involves a demilitarized Palestinian state that can be established gradually over three years’ time, starting from full implementation of the Oslo Accord principles. Expectations are not high, given the position of the Israeli government, but this may pave the way for further promising changes in the future.”

The TSI’s International Decisions & Norms parameter rises from 8.0 to 9.0 this month.

The Palestinian and Israeli Streets

The start of Ramadan this month was markedly solemn in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, out of feelings of national solidarity for the dire situation of Palestinians in Gaza. However, the holy month for Muslims, which often coincides with an uptick in tensions and violence focused on access to Al Aqsa, has not led to the conflagration that some experts feared (and some extremists hoped for). Despite numerous incidents of violence in the West Bank, Netanyahu’s rejection of Minister Ben Gvir’s stringent measures to limit access of Muslim worshippers to Al Aqsa and the continued stability within Israel’s mixed cities were a disappointment to the Hamas leaders calling for Palestinian mobilization around the usually incendiary issue of Jerusalem.

Dr. Khalil Shikaki published an updated Palestinian public opinion poll this month which shows a significant increase in Palestinian support for a two-state solution to 45%; while support in the West Bank increased only slightly, from 33% in December 2023 to 34% this month, support in the Gaza Strip rose from 35% to 62%.

Source: PCPSR March 2024 Poll

Nidal Foqaha attributes the change to a mindset shift caused by the hardships of the war: “The people [in Gaza] realize that at the end of the day there is no path forward other than peace and separation, and the best way to accomplish that is two states for two peoples.” He explains that the West Bank has not seen a similar shift yet since “the way West Bank Palestinians assess the two-state solution is always connected to the reality on the ground, mainly the Israeli settlement project.” Worsening living conditions, increased settler violence and ongoing developments towards settlement expansion make Palestinians living amongst the settlements skeptical and more likely to oppose a two-state solution.

Foqaha also points out that the poll shows steady (and relatively small) levels of support all other endgames to the conflict. “Neither the one state solution nor confederation enjoy any increase in support. The two-state solution remains the only game in town.”

On the Israeli street, the number of protesters, anger with the government, and public calls for a negotiated deal to save the hostages have grown, with multi-day mass protests launched in Jerusalem on the last day of March. One of the central claims is that military pressure alone has clearly failed to bring Israeli hostages back home.

The Palestinian Public Opinion parameter increases this month from 3.0 to 4.0.

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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