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The Day After Begins Now
Crossroads in the War: Ceasefire or Escalation?

This past month has seen rapid developments in all arenas, with continued international focus on the two-state solution increasingly translated into concrete steps and policies, the publication of PM Netanyahu's guiding principles for the "day after," further changes in the Palestinian Authority, and an ever-worsening situation on the ground for Gazan civilians. With mixed reports about the viability of hostage-prisoner negotiations, IDF plans to invade Rafah, and Ramadan on the horizon, the upcoming month will determine whether the war takes a turn towards further escalation or a pause in the fighting.  

This month’s Two State Index will examine:

  • The components - and missing pieces - of Netanyahu's proposal for the "day after" in Gaza;
  • Concrete moves by key international actors to pressure and incentivize the parties towards a two-state solution;
  • Developments in the Palestinian arena;
  • The challenges and choices that March will bring, with the potential for a significant escalation or abatement of the violence.  


As a result of parameter changes analyzed below, the Two-State Index decreased by 0.6%, dropping from 5.18 to 5.15. 

 

 

 

 

The Netanyahu “Doctrine”:

This month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented his positions regarding the “day after” the war (the document itself is entitled “the day after Hamas”) to the security cabinet. This is the first time since the start of the war that Netanyahu has published a proposal for some kind of management of the Gaza Strip following the war. The lack of an articulated vision has drawn extensive criticism, both internationally and within Israel. 

The main points in the document of principles concern the future rule of Gaza in the “medium term”: the proposal states that Israel will retain military control of all territory west of Jordan (Gaza and the West Bank), and assume responsibility for the disarmament of the entire Gaza Strip. These arrangements indicate indefinitely continuous IDF military presence in Gaza. In terms of governance, Netanyahu proposes that “local stakeholders with administrative experience” who are “not affiliated with countries or entities that support terrorism” (hinting that according to his previous definition, there will be no PA involvement) to manage Gazan civil administration.



Gazan Professor of Political Science Mukhaimar Abu Sada asserts that the Netanyahu proposal is a continuation and extension of past failed policies: “You can’t repeat the previous plans expecting different results. This plans means repeating the direct occupation, the same blockade.” He adds that the policies outlined in the document will almost certainly be met by Palestinians with continued - and potentially even escalated - violence. 

On the whole, the document is more notable for what it leaves out than for its content. Unsurprisingly given his past statements and positions, the only two points put forth under Netanyahu’s long-term vision for the Strip are declarations of opposition, without any positive affirmation of principles: a rejection of international dictates regarding an agreement with the Palestinians, and of unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by third parties. There is no constructive long-term proposal for addressing, let alone resolving, the broader conflict. The Palestinian President’s office called the plan “destined to fail” and accused Israel of “attempts to alter the geographic and demographic reality in the Gaza Strip.”


Conflict expert and Geneva Initiative steering committee member, Dr. Shaul Arieli, notes that “the most important point here is that people believed Netanyahu has no plan. After this document was published, it turns out that Netanyahu does have a clear goal for the war. His goal is to maintain the differentiation policy between Gaza and the West Bank. He didn’t learn anything from October 7th. He wants to go back to the exact same strategy.”

Netanyahu has not presented his proposal for a cabinet vote or resolution, and has claimed that he intends it to be used in general cabinet deliberations (and of course, as a talking point against accusations of irresponsible lack of vision). Publication of the document follows closely on the heels of a cabinet vote against unilateral moves to recognize a state of Palestine, a position reaffirmed in the “long-term” section of the document. The position was also adopted by the vast majority of the Knesset. 

According to Dr. Arieli: 

“The plan that Netanyahu presented for the ‘day after’ is actually a plan for the day before elections. It’s a collection of election slogans that can be sold to coalition voters – destroying Hamas, no to a Palestinian state, dissolving UNRWA, a security zone in Gaza, etc.”

With the announcement of Defense Minister Gallant’s intentions to allow centrist members of the security cabinet have the final say regarding legislation on the ultra-Orthodox military draft exemptions, the “day before elections” may be closer than expected. An election season in Israel, unlike previous cycles in the last few years, is certain to focus primarily on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with debates about which ideological “conceptions” led to the security failures of October 7th and the best way to address the Palestinian issue going forward. 

Netanyahu’s positions and statements regarding the two-state solution bring the TSI's Israeli Prime Minister/Leadership parameter down to from 3.0 to 2.0 out of 10. 

 

 

The International Arena:

Personal tensions were reported between US President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu earlier in February, with leaks and some pointed public statements indicating increased American frustration with the Israeli government. The US continues to support Israel in the war on multiple playing fields, voting to block a UN Security Council Resolution for humanitarian pauses and aid due to its failure to mention Israel’s security needs and blocking the recent UNSC statement blaming Israel for opening fire on Gazans rushing towards aid delivery. At the same time, key European countries are growing increasingly critical of Israel’s war effort: Ireland and Spain have demanded an EU review of Israel trade deals in view of the situation in Gaza, and EU High Representative of Foreign Policy Josep Borrell called recent settlement expansion plans “a grave breach of international law.” An EU consensus statement against Israel’s planned invasion of Rafah was blocked twice by Hungary, but 26 out of 27 of the member states supported the statement. The ICJ deliberations on the legality of Israel’s continued presence in the West Bank is another sign of increasing pressure.

In a move to address rising settler violence in the West Bank with concrete steps, multiple countries this month began to concretize earlier announcements of sanctions and visa entry bans for violent Israeli settlers. The United States and the United Kingdom applied sanctions to four settlers (with only one overlapping name in the list), while France published a travel ban against 28 settlers. New Zealand is the latest to impose a travel ban on extremist settlers, alongside a designation of Hamas as a terrorist entity. The trend has received extensive attention in Israeli media, criticism by far-right politicians, and follow-up by Israeli financial institutions.


In addition to increasingly critical statements and steps directed at Israel, more countries are considering unilateral actions to advance Palestinian statehood, despite the current absence of an Israeli government willing to play ball. The UK, US, France, and Italy are all reportedly considering recognition of Palestinian statehood, despite these countries’ previous positions against unilateral measures. 

Dr. Maya Sion, Director of the Israel–Europe Relations Program at the Mitvim Institute, notes that the likelihood of unilateral recognition depends to some extent on Israel: 

“As long as the Israeli government doesn’t publish a plan for the ‘day after’ that is basically compatible with the rest of the world’s vision, particularly the United States, Europe, and pragmatic Arab states, the likelihood of unilateral recognition goes up.” 

Dr. Sion points out that the act of official recognition by third parties will not in and of itself constitute a State of Palestine. “It has some consequences in terms of diplomatic relations, international institutions, and legal aspects, but it’s a primarily symbolic act. Recognition doesn’t create borders.” At the same time, symbolic steps - for example, the relocation of an Embassy - have already been shown to have tremendous significance for local leaders, and have the potential to shape trends and policies in their own right. 

The EU continues to work on a “Peace Supporting Package” that will offer the parties incentives to reach a political agreement by clarifying a range of advantages and dividends once a peace agreement is reached. The Peace Day Effort was launched shortly before the start of the war, which impacted the visibility and salience of the initiative, but discussions about how to best promote these efforts are ongoing. 

The TSI’s International actor’s parameter rises from 8.33 to 8.79 out of 10. The Lawfare: legal institutions and proceedings parameter rises from 7 to 8.

 

 

The Palestinian Arena:

While international criticism and concern does not at the moment appear to have a clear and tangible impact on the Israeli government, the American administration has been more effective in pressing for reforms within the Palestinian Authority. In late February, Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh tendered his resignation. This follows the announcement of a series of administrative reforms within the PA, including appointment of regional governors and economic measures. These are seen as steps towards the “revitalized PA” that the US presents as a critical component of the road to a two-state solution. 

There is widespread skepticism among both Palestinians and Israelis that these reforms and changes will allow the PA to take control of Gaza in the short term. Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh argues that a technocratic administration is the viable next step for local governance of the Strip: 

“This is an imperative path for Palestinians at large, including the rivals Fatah and Hamas. There is no way for Hamas to run Gaza anymore, and no way for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza with Hamas’s endorsement, therefore they need to have an agreement on a new government.”

Hamas official Moussa Abu Marzouk explicitly indicated readiness to accept a technocratic government in Gaza after the war, going on the record during an interview with an Egyptian news channel. In December, Abu Marzouk was quoted by Al Monitor saying that Hamas would be willing to join the PLO and respect all previous agreements – including the PLO’s official recognition of Israel. He issued a somewhat ambiguous retraction shortly afterwards. Many Palestinian analysts see the incorporation of Hamas into the PLO as the only way forward towards effective negotiations with public support in the deadlocked conflict. 


On the last day of February, the shattering human cost of the war in Gaza was highlighted with news about dozens (according to the Gazan Health Ministry, over one hundred) of Palestinians killed while rushing towards an aid convoy. Although the parties present different narratives, with the IDF attributing the majority of deaths to a stampede and the Hamas-led Ministry of Health asserting that the Gazan fatalities were caused directly by IDF fire, the event is a clear-cut instance of the growing desperation and chaos characterizing the situation of Palestinians in northern Gaza.  

Israeli journalist Nadav Eyal wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that Israeli security officials have repeatedly warned the government that aid deliveries into Gaza must be accompanied by an armed escort not composed of IDF forces, and have proposed a range of options (e.g. humanitarian islands or allowing PA personnel into Gaza) that could have prevented the shocking events on Thursday. The government under Netanyahu, he reports, has repeatedly refused. 

The Gazan Health Ministry reports that Palestinian deaths in Gaza have surpassed 30,000 this month.

The parameter for Governance in Gaza decreases from 3.0 to 2.0. Future internal reforms could lead to an increase in the Integrity of Palestinian governance parameter, currently at a value of 2.0.

 

 

Crossroads in the War: Potential Shifts:

March is likely to bring dramatic shifts in the war as well as the broader conflict: Questions about a hostage deal, an Israeli invasion of Rafah, Al Aqsa/Temple Mount measures during Ramadan, and a growing potential for Israeli elections have massive implications for whether diplomacy or severe escalation will characterize the conflict in the coming month.  

Negotiations for a hostage deal based on a temporary ceasefire are ongoing, with mixed signals from different parties about the timeline and likelihood of reaching an agreement. Adel Zanoun, a Palestinian writer currently based in Rafah, says that “Hamas has softened its position in the hostage-prisoner talks, paving the way for the first phase of a ceasefire of 42 days, which might lead to another extended swap and ceasefire.” 

Zanoun adds that this would not by itself prevent continued operations in Gaza: “The Israeli plan for invading Rafah is still largely expected, with more severe casualties and suffering of the Gazan people crammed into the small city.” An invasion of Rafah would have a catastrophic humanitarian impact on the Gazan population, and will further strain relations between Israel and key allies like Egypt. 

On the Israeli side, the government’s perceived lack of prioritization towards reaching a deal to free Israeli hostages sparked anger and a more overtly political tone to the hostage solidarity rallies attended by thousands of Israelis weekly. The protests increasingly focus on calls for elections in addition to a hostage deal, with more aggressive protest tactics (e.g. road blocks) and violent police responses. 

Dr. Arieli notes another shift within the grassroots protest movement: 

“You hear more calls for a political process from some voices in the protest movement. The whole world is talking about a political solution. The Israeli public can’t ignore this and focus on other things, like the judicial reform. It will take up more and more space as time goes on.” 

Although focus remains on Gaza and the threat of further escalations with Hezbollah in the north, developments in the West Bank could also spiral significantly in the coming month. Daraghmeh warns: 

“The Israeli government’s restrictions on accessing the Al-Aqsa mosque in Ramadan, in addition to the restrictions on the economy in terms of withholding tax revenues and preventing workers from working in Israel, is a recipe for an explosion in West Bank.”


All of the above will have an impact on the northern front of the war between Israel and Hezbollah. With a major escalation still very much on the table, developments in negotiations, Rafah, and Jerusalem are directly related to the possibility of the already bloody war igniting into a regional confrontation. 

The parameter for Economic Stability in the West Bank decreases from 4.0 to 3.0. 

 

 

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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