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Re-Shaping Israeli-Palestinian Horizons in 2024
Re-Shaping Israeli-Palestinian Horizons in 2024

As 2023 comes to a somber close amid war, devastation and suffering that is transforming the way Israelis and Palestinians understand the conflict, local and international political leaders have an opportunity to re-shape a path towards stability and peace in the new year. Developments in December emphasized waning international support for an Israeli ground offensive that has killed more than 21,000 Gazans, according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, and has led to a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The Israeli government’s lack of vision for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip is also under scrutiny as the US and other international players are reinvigorated to push for a two-state solution as the only arrangement that can bring about lasting peace and security.

This month’s Two State Index will examine:

  • Increasing international demands for a ceasefire, and why the US has not joined calls for ending the Israeli offensive;
  • Hamas’ role in the Palestinian political landscape, and the viability of eliminating it as a political entity; 
  • Why both Palestinian and Israeli public support for a two-state solution has remained relatively stable since October 7th
  • Trends in the West Bank including surging support for Hamas, Israeli settlement expansion, and extremist settler violence


As a result of parameter changes analyzed below, the Two-State Index decreased by 0.8%, dropping from 5.16 to 5.12. 

 

 

 

 

International Calls for Ceasefire Increasingly Isolate Biden Administration: 
The US Pressure Dynamic Explained

International calls for Israel to cease its ground operations in Gaza mounted this month as the Palestinian death toll climbed to over 21,000, according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, and humanitarian organizations warned of catastrophic health conditions and looming famine in the enclave. The war is exacting a heavy toll on the Israeli side as well, as the number of troops killed in combat reached 172 this month.

Calls for a ceasefire have begun to appear in Israel as grassroots protests spearheaded by the families of Israeli hostages quickly gain traction, reflecting broad public support for any deal that would enable negotiations to bring home 129 Israeli captives held by Hamas in Gaza. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is among notable Israeli public figures advocating for a ceasefire, writing in an op-ed that Israel’s obligation to free its hostages outweighs any potential military gains that endanger them, in light of the fact that the complete annihilation of Hamas is an unachievable objective.


Indeed, mass protests and public disruptions in major cities around the world are increasing pressure on global leaders to end their diplomatic and financial support for Israel’s war against Hamas. French President Emmanuel Macron urged Israel to agree to a "lasting ceasefire" in Gaza during a call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. UK Foreign Minister David Cameron and German Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock also voiced their support for a “sustainable ceasefire” (though not necessarily an “immediate ceasefire”).

Amid such calls, US President Joe Biden’s administration appears increasingly isolated on the world stage in its full-throated support for Israel. At the same time, any public confrontation or resistance to US pressure could serve Netanyahu at home politically, as was the case under the Obama administration. Instead of calling explicitly for a ceasefire, the US approach has been to apply quiet pressure on Israel to change the dynamics, scale, and timeline of the war. 



US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan were dispatched to Israel multiple times this month to discuss the “objectives and phasing” of the war with Israeli officials. The US also withheld its veto of a UN Security Council resolution, toned down under American pressure, calling for steps to boost humanitarian aid to Gaza and “create the conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities".

The US response to the October 7 attacks and subsequent war in Gaza has curried a great deal of credit with the Israeli public and the White House is wielding this diplomatic leverage to its advantage – exacting Israeli concessions and influencing Israel’s wartime decisions and policies behind closed doors. Still, Biden’s approach has drawn fierce criticism from Palestinians and their allies in the Arab world, and increasingly among some US lawmakers as the White House fast-tracks weapons shipment to Israel bypassing congressional reviews.

Ultimately, however, the complex set of diplomatic arrangements that will be required in the wake of the war requires sensitive and strategic maneuvering on the part of Washington to secure Israeli trust and buy-in with an eye on the ultimate US policy goal of revitalizing the two-state solution.

The Geneva Initiative’s Israeli Director General, Gadi Baltiansky, points out the fundamental incongruity between US and the Israeli government’s current positions: “President Biden needs to set Prime Minister Netanyahu two clear alternatives: Either choose the United States, or choose Ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir. Netanyahu can’t hide behind his coalition partners in order to avoid transferring tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority, presenting a plan for the day after the war, or advancing a political horizon. That is the only way to obtain the Arab world and the PA’s involvement in running Gaza.” 

The TSI’s Israeli Public Discourse and Palestinian Public Discourse parameters – tracking how discourse among media, public, and officials influences prioritization of the two-state solution on the Israeli public or political agenda – both fall to 5/10 this month. 

Calls for a ceasefire among Israeli and Palestinian officials have centered on issues of hostage negotiations and urgent humanitarian aid, but the two-state solution has been largely absent or marginalized in the rhetoric of Israeli and Palestinian public officials and media discourse, and is currently emphasized more by international actors and analysts.

 

 

Grappling With a Vision for “The Day After”

Lack of an Israeli Exit Strategy:

The apparent absence of an Israeli exit strategy drew scrutiny this month, particularly in light of a lack of consensus in Israel over a post-war governance structure for Gaza as well as increasing skepticism regarding the feasibility of Israel’s goal to eliminate both Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. 

While Netanyahu has stated repeatedly that Israel has no intention of re-occupying Gaza after the war, the government has struggled to articulate a coherent vision for Palestinian governance. Sharp rhetoric from Netanyahu this month indicated staunch opposition to Palestinian statehood and the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza – a preference US President Joe Biden conveyed publicly last month, given necessary reforms in the PA.

“Netanyahu has a vision for the day after,” says Baltiansky. “But this vision is not all that different than the current situation: continued fighting, continued state of emergency, continued broad coalition government, and continued obstacles against the public demand for elections and new leadership. The problem is that this is a ‘day after’ vision for Netanyahu, and not for Israel.”


Netanyahu outlined his conditions for post-war peace with the Palestinians in a December op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, but made no mention of the two-state solution and reiterated his opposition to the PA ruling Gaza. 

The Israeli public is overwhelmingly unconvinced of Netanyahu’s long-term strategy, with 64% believing the government does not have a clear plan of action for the end of the war, according to a poll by the Israel Democracy Institute. Though staunchly opposed to Hamas’ continued rule in Gaza, only 11% of Israelis support the return of the PA to power in Gaza, while 23% would like to see US-aligned Arab states take power, 22% the Israeli military, and 18% an international coalition, according to a Hebrew University poll.
Source: IDI
Source: Israel Democracy Institute

Hamas as a Palestinian Political Reality

Analysts caution, however, that any post-war governance structure that excludes Hamas is doomed to fail.

“Any plan to re-stabilize Gaza after the war cannot work without Hamas’ involvement,” says Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh. “It might be possible for Israel to destroy Hamas’ military wing, if it can afford a long war of attrition. But it is impossible to eliminate Hamas as a deeply rooted political movement. Hamas is a key political party in the Palestinian arena, particularly in Gaza Strip where is no other Palestinian government would be able to operate without Hamas’ endorsement.”

Dr. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), agrees: “None of the Palestinian political factions would want to be part of a ruling coalition that Hamas is excluded from. None would take the risk. Hamas can make it very difficult for any government to operate, enforce law and order, and provide services in Gaza. Only a broad coalition that involves all Palestinian factions – including Hamas – can effectively take control over Gaza.”


“Joining a broad coalition government will have no impact on Hamas’ ideological positions. But so long as the ruling government in place acts in accordance with existing agreements, Hamas’ ideological positions will not prevent any such government from functioning effectively,” Shikaki says.

Even before the dust has settled in Gaza, top Hamas political officials Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Meshaal have been holding discussions with PLO and Fatah representatives including Hussein Al-Sheikh, Mohammed Dahlan, and former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to carve out a place for the group in a post-war governance structure. While these talks may have created internal tensions with Hamas’ military leader Yahya Sinwar, they reflect an inescapable truth – Hamas will remain a political actor after the war.

Two-State Solution is Key to Long-Term, Pragmatic Palestinian Governance:

Whatever form the immediate post-war transitional phase takes, the Palestinian public will continue to demand eventual democratic elections. With support for Hamas surging in both Gaza and the West Bank, and the legitimacy of President Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestinian Authority plummeting, observers and analysts have warned against imposing an unelected government that is not broadly supported by the Palestinian people – looking to the events preceding Hamas’ 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip as a cautionary tale.

“If the vision for post-war Palestinian governance is a national unity government comprised of senior political figures from the PA and other factions, this will not have the broad support of the Palestinian people. It will be very difficult for Abbas to bring senior PA officials to a new government because of its current lack of legitimacy,” says Shikaki. “But a government of technocrats with the support of all Palestinian political factions – including Hamas – will not be judged by the same criteria.”

Shikaki says that above all else, without concrete progress towards re-establishing the horizon for a two-state solution, Hamas will continue to thrive.


“We don’t know and can’t predict under what conditions democratic Palestinian elections will eventually be held, but prevailing conditions at the time will determine Hamas’ level of support and influence. If elections are held in a climate of war and conflict, Hamas stands to do extremely well in a popular vote. Support for Hamas is also likely to be high in a ‘status-quo’ scenario, in which there is no war, but Israeli-Palestinian relations are not moving in a positive direction as currently – with unrestricted settlement construction, settler violence, and no prospect for a two-state solution.”

“It is critical that some level of stability be restored and Israel-Palestinian relations move in a positive direction – that means the two-state solution is considered viable and realistic.”

No changes are recorded to relevant TSI parameters.

 

 

Israeli & Palestinian Opinion Polls Clarify: 
Two States for Two Peoples Remains the Most Preferred Solution

Public opinion polls conducted in the wake of the October 7th attacks and in the midst of the Gaza war shows relatively unchanged support for the two-state solution among both Israelis and Palestinians. Analysts say the results of the polls highlight deep levels of distrust that underscores separation as the only long-term, sustainable solution to decades of violence and bloodshed.

On the Israeli side, the TAU Peace Index found a 3% decline in support for the two-state solution from 39% in July to 36% in November. A poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in December found an identical level of support for the two-state solution. Meanwhile, a poll published by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem showed that a slight majority of Israelis (56%) are opposed to annexing and re-settling the Gaza Strip, versus 33% who would support annexation and 11% who were undecided. 

The poll results demonstrate the resilience of moderate positions in the Israeli mainstream despite the unprecedented nature of Hamas’ surprise October massacres and the legitimacy lent to hardline rhetoric from Israel’s far-right in the wake of the attacks.


“The Israeli public isn’t concerned right now with the solution to the conflict, because it’s currently consumed with the problem,” Baltiansky notes. “It’s difficult to think about peace when you’re in the middle of a war. When the dust settles, however, the public will look for an alternative to the reality that existed up until October 6th. There are only two possibilities on the table. Israelis will eventually need to choose between the unilateral policies of the extreme right, or a political agreement between Israel and the representatives of the Palestinian people.”

On the Palestinian side, a poll published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) found that support for the two-state solution actually increased from 32% to 34% between September to December, despite an overall lack of confidence among Palestinians in the seriousness of current international rhetoric about reviving the two-state solution.

“The Gaza war has proven that the only sustainable solution to the conflict is a separation between the two peoples in two states. The war has generated too much hatred and animosity between the sides. Too much blood has been shed and each people’s trauma has created a real need for separation behind secure borders with the presence of international forces to ensure long-term stability,” Daraghmeh says.

“Palestinians and Israelis are overwhelmingly unwilling to live with each other, making separation the only sustainable solution.”

No changes are recorded to relevant TSI parameters.

 

 

Trends Point to Inevitable Explosion in West Bank and East Jerusalem Without Change of Course

Developments in the West Bank this month saw the continuation of negative and damaging trends likely to lead to an explosion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem without an immediate change of course. Ongoing settlement expansion, a rise in settler violence, unprecedented Israeli raids deep within PA territory, burgeoning support for Hamas and other guerilla militia groups in West Bank strongholds, and a consistent and significant deterioration in the PA’s legitimacy and authority have all been well-tracked by the TSI over the past year. 

Support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the Israeli occupation rose to a staggering 70% this month alongside a surge in support for Hamas. And while there remains deep concern among West Bank Palestinians over a scenario similar to that currently unfolding in Gaza if a new popular uprising erupted, the situation is liable to destabilize further if negative trends are not reversed. Notable developments this month included:

East Jerusalem and West Bank Violence:

  • 3 Israelis were killed in an East Jerusalem shooting attack claimed by Hamas. A fourth Israeli was killed accidentally by an off-duty Israeli soldier who mistook the armed civilian for a terrorist.
  • Israeli forces conducted large-scale raids deep in West Bank territory, including a rare 60-hour operation in Jenin and airstrikes near Tulkarem. Air raids in the West Bank which began as part of Israeli counter-terror operations earlier this year marked the first aerial bombardments in the territory since the end of the Second Intifada, and are being used with increasing frequency.
  • According to the PA health ministry, at least 280 West Bank Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces since October 7 while more than 2,400 have been arrested, of whom around 1,200 are affiliated with Hamas.
  • Israel this month allowed some 8,000 Palestinian workers to return to work in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. A majority of Palestinians holding Israeli work permits are still barred from returning to places of employment, while the Israeli government reportedly weighs a plan to replace all Palestinian laborers with foreign workers from other countries.


Israeli Settlement Expansion & Settler Violence:

  • 1,738 housing units approved for construction in East Jerusalem’s Lower Aqueduct settlement. Half of the Lower Aqueduct settlement is situated beyond the Green Line in East Jerusalem, while the other half is within the Green Line. But its strategic location in the E1 corridor poses a threat to Palestinian territorial contiguity and severs the West Bank from East Jerusalem.
  • At least 7 illegal settlement outposts were erected this month, in addition to a number of others erected and demolished in the wake of the October 7 attacks.
  • An Israeli parliamentary committee approved NIS 200 million ($55 million) for illegal settlement outposts, following an increase of over NIS 300 million the Settlements and National Projects Ministry received in an earlier supplementary budget approval. 
  • A sharp rise in settler violence against Palestinians across the West Bank continued, with organized attacks, threats, intimidation, property damage, and physical assaults recorded mainly in the southern Hebron hills and the Jordan Valley. 
  • Three Israeli settlers have been placed in administrative detention since October 7 in connection with such incidents, while the US and EU have declared new visa restrictions on settler extremists in an effort to curb the rise in violence.


No changes are recorded to relevant parameters.

 

 

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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