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A Moment of Reckoning.
What's Next?

While developments in November have left many open questions about the future timeline and scope of the ongoing war, it has shed critical light on key players’ strategic goals. Clarifications regarding these positions and policy visions come amidst a rising death-toll in Gaza, escalated tensions in the West Bank, and fraught negotiations over a temporary ceasefire. 
 
Despite (and to some degree, because of) the continuous nature of national trauma, many have begun to not only ask questions but to propose answers and directions for a “day after” the war. This month’s index will begin with the issues most likely to shape the immediate trajectory of the war, followed by in-depth analysis of the political and policy conditions that will shape the future of the region long after this war ends.


As a result of parameter changes analyzed below, the Two-State Index decreased by 1.0%, dropping from 5.21 to 5.16. 

 

 

 

 

What’s Next in the War 
 
International pressure:
 
After the temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hamas ends, international pressure for humanitarian interventions and protest of Gazan civilian casualties is likely to increase. A UNSC resolution on humanitarian pauses in mid-November was the first sign of a united international position, and a rare moment of agreement between Security Council members on a Middle East issue. More statements and steps of this nature are likely to follow, especially following Israeli expected operations in the south of the strip. Keep an eye on shifts in US rhetoric, in particular. 
 
Israeli public mood:
 
Israel’s short-term policy priorities have shifted significantly over the last few weeks. In Prime Minister Netanyahu’s October 9th statement outlining five goals for the war, hostage release was not on the agenda. Immense public pressure in Israel, including street demonstrations, media campaigns, and intensive lobbying, alongside the impact of the military operation and US pressure have reordered the priorities and led the way to a temporary ceasefire and hostage-prisoner swap. Even the National Religious political party led by Minister Smotrich supported the deal at the last minute, despite originally opposing any pause in the fighting (Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit party, in contrast, voted against). The images of hostages reuniting with their families are likely to strengthen public opinion that hostage release should be the government’s foremost policy priority. A recent IDI poll shows that hostage release is the most important goal of the war for the Israeli public (see graph below). If official policies going forward don’t reflect the same priorities, there is a potential for mass grassroots protests reminiscent of the anti-judicial reform movement prior to the war.  

Public opinion research by the aChord Center following October 7th also shows that 60% of the Israeli public believes a strong military effort must be accompanied by political and security agreements with moderate Palestinians, in order to ensure Israel’s security.  
 
Palestinian Public Mood:
 
With all eyes on the destruction and human cost of the war in Gaza, Palestinian public opinion in both the West Bank and Gaza overwhelmingly supports Hamas over what many perceive to be a passive and ineffective Fatah. According to Head of PSR Survey Research Unit Walid Ladadweh, there are indications in Gaza that "for the first time ever, Hamas leader Ismael Haniyeh can defeat President Mahmoud Abbas in an election by more than 40 percent.” Notably, Ladadweh adds, Haniyeh is also the preferred option over popular jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, who has proven a more popular candidate than either Haniyeh or Abbas in previous public opinion research.  
Ladadweh explains, “These results are normal, as people under occupation will always support whoever fights the occupation and makes sacrifices for the ultimate national goal.” 
Hamas’s popularity is likely to remain high for as long as the fighting and casualties in both Gaza and the West Bank continue.  
 
Regional involvement:
 
Regional actors like Egypt and Qatar are establishing their own importance as the war continues, particularly in the context of the hostage negotiations. This creates potential for a renewed Arab Peace Initiative, and highlights both the importance and limitations of Israel’s diplomatic relations with regional actors. The more interest these state actors take in conflict mediation now, the more plausibility there is to proposing a regional aspect to any interim arrangements towards rehabilitation and self-governance in the Gaza Strip. That said, without a clear framework directing all interim steps towards a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, these players’ involvement is unlikely.  
 
Horizons for escalation:

Hezbollah stepped up attacks on Israel this month, with tens of thousands of civilians from both sides of the border leaving their homes. Residents of northern Israel will have difficulty returning home with no changes to the situation in southern Lebanon, and the Israeli government will need to find a solution to their needs. An expanded northern front is still a possibility, particularly in the event of miscalculations, and would be a complete game changer for the war (both during and after).  

There are no relevant parameter changes for this section. 

 

 


The Future of Gaza 
 
This month has seen renewed international calls for a two-state solution, and explicit support from the United States for a return of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip (with reference to “interim security measures” supported by the international community). EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell, similarly endorsed the two-state solution and return of the PA to Gaza, after visiting the region and meeting a number of stakeholders (including the Geneva Initiative). Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi also called for a two-state solution, notably announcing readiness to consider a solution that includes “NATO forces, United Nations forces, or Arab or American forces” as a step towards a future non-militarized Palestinian state as a security guarantee for Israel.  


 
“You have three candidates to fill the void in Gaza,” notes former senior adviser to the heads of General Security Services in Israel and expert on Palestinian affairs Dr. Matti Steinberg. “One is Hamas, but they’re off the table for obvious reasons. If Israel fills the void, it will be considered by the entire world a situation of de facto annexation. It will create a destabilized situation that will play into the hands of whatever remains of Hamas, who will wage a guerrilla war in Gaza. Essentially a Vietnamization, or Lebanonization, of Gaza. There are elements in Hamas that aspire to turn Gaza into a deep swamp for Israel. The only viable option is a revived Palestinian Authority, which is only possible with a comprehensive political framework.” 
 
While the most powerful and relevant international players appear to have come to a general consensus on the best way forward, Israeli and Palestinian leaders are far from convinced.  
 
Israel: 

Prime Minister Netanyahu expects Israel to have “overall security responsibility” for the Gaza Strip after the war, although he has directly refuted the discourse of the Israeli far-right advocating for new settlements in Gaza, calling this “not a realistic goal.” It remains unclear what Netanyahu means by overall security responsibility, and how long the arrangement would last. He has also made statements indicating his continued opposition to a return of the PA as the main governing entity in Gaza. Right-wing talking heads and political organizations have increased attacks on the PA’s legitimacy with a public-facing campaign that aims to equate between the PA and Hamas. The underlying motivation of these steps is clearly to preempt the risk of a united Palestinian leadership, either out of genuine distrust for the PA or due to ideological motives opposing any steps towards Palestinian statehood and the possibility of future compromises on territory.  

 
The Palestinian Authority: 
 
President Mahmoud Abbas has been clear  that the PA cannot return to Gaza without a comprehensive political framework oriented towards a two-state solution. Meanwhile, support for the PA and for Abbas himself in West Bank is extremely low and support for Hamas continues to rise, particularly as the latter receives credit for West Bank security prisoners freed in exchange for Israeli hostages. Even strong supporters of the PA’s return to Gaza use language of a “reformed” or “revitalized” Authority to acknowledge issues in the current political entity, regardless of the Israeli government’s relationship with it.  


 
Hamas: 
 
Israeli political and military officials have stated that they will not tolerate a “day after” scenario that leaves Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Hamas’s rising popularity has some arguing that no viable local political arrangements can leave the organization out completely. Palestinian analyst Esmat Mansour asserts, “The Palestinian Authority cannot claim a proper representation of the Palestinian people, and the international community also cannot ignore the heavy weight of Hamas in the street.” 
 
What conditions would allow for the incorporation of Hamas into a restructured Palestinian representative entity recognized by the international community? “The moment a political process is considered inevitable, maybe sections within Hamas like its ‘dawa’ - associated with civilian infrastructure – would decide to enter the process,” Dr. Steinberg explains. “They wouldn’t be the representative. But they could be a kind of loyal opposition.” 
 
He adds, however, that “as soon as those from Hamas accept the framework of a political agreement, they cease to be Hamas. It goes against everything Hamas stands for.”  


This month sees several changes in the political and public arena: the “Hamas Leadership” parameter decreases, indicating how supportive prominent Hamas voices are of internal reconciliation that would empower the PLO chairman to negotiate a two-state solution. The parameters reflecting support of the United States, EU, and the Arab world of the two-state solution increases, in parallel to important statements and visits. Both the Palestinian public opinion and Israeli public discourse parameters decrease.  

 

 


Meanwhile, in the West Bank 
 
With all eyes on Gaza, the developments in the West Bank are slipping under the radar in Israeli and to a large extent international discourse. The geopolitical conditions there, however, will have a critical impact on the viability of any strategy towards reestablishing stability, let alone a comprehensive peace agreement, once the war ends. 
 
Notable developments in November: 
 
  • Over 200 Palestinians killed and 3000 arrests (with many already released) since the start of war. 

  • Hamas claims credit for an attack which kills three Israeli civilians, carried out by Palestinians from East Jerusalem 

  • Journalists on the ground report an increase in both scope and frequency of IDF raids, settler violence, and soldier presence. IDF activity in Area A of the West Bank has continued during the ceasefire. 

  • Peace Now reports illegal outpost and road construction. 

  • Minister Bezalel Smotrich proposes “buffer zones” around settlements, which would further restrict Palestinian territorial access. 

  • The story of Palestinians publicly lynched after accusations of serving as “collaborators” with Israel was publicized extensively throughout Israel as a sign of the radicalization of the West Bank, and the PA’s lack of willingness or ability to exert rule of law.  

  • 150,000 Palestinians who entered Israel on a daily basis for work before the war are not permitted to cross checkpoints, leaving many without their main source of income. 

  • Many checkpoints have been added within the West Bank, making Palestinian internal movement more challenging. 


As Israeli and Palestinian public opinion both turn sharply against the PA, the vacuum of legitimate leadership in the West Bank is being increasingly filled by a preference for Hamas. The “day after” discussion taking place both in Israel and internationally largely relies on the assumption that Hamas will be destroyed by the time the war ends. However, in a scenario where Israel successfully destroys Hamas’s military and even civil administrative capacity in Gaza, there is currently no coherent strategy -- either by the PA or the Israeli government -- for addressing the fact that the Hamas political base in the West Bank is currently growing, beyond a series of accelerated arrests that currently only appear to radicalize pro-Hamas elements of the population still further.  
 
According to Palestinian analyst Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Only a meaningful and productive peace process based on a two-state solution with a plan to rebuild Gaza and rebuild the Palestinian political system can save Fateh and provide it with a life line.” 
 
The growing popularity of Hamas in the West Bank is hailed by anti-two state solution voices as evidence that there is no Palestinian partner for peace, instead of as evidence that entrenched Israeli security and civilian presence in the West Bank has failed to bring real security.  
 
“If violence is the guiding principle, people will turn to Hamas. If diplomacy is the guiding principle, people will turn to the Palestinian Authority. It’s quite simple,” notes Dr. Steinberg. 

Renewal of negotiations towards a comprehensive political process is the basic condition for renewing the PA’s legitimacy, and this remains unlikely under a Netanyahu government. However, there is a very plausible scenario in which Netanyahu is no longer in power the “day after” the war, given his performance in public opinion polls since the outbreak of the war. Whatever Israeli political constellation forms in his wake, the possibility of a two-state solution will also depend on a Palestinian political entity that has enough control and legitimacy to operate in both the West Bank and Gaza, and is pragmatic enough to negotiate permanent borders with Israel. This outcome also heavily depends on the continued investment and attention of the entire international community, particularly that of the United States. The question of whether international players will actively work towards a new political horizon is of paramount importance to the future of the two nations. 
 
 The parameter reflecting ties between the West Bank and Gaza increases this month, as a result of the national solidarity shown during the war. The parameter related to recognition/narrative/reconciliation drops this month.  

 

 

The Two-State Index (TSI) is part of the Two-State Coalition (TSC) that is brought to you by the Geneva Initiative, a Palestinian-Israeli organization working to promote a negotiated peace agreement in the spirit of the two-state vision. The TSI is part of the Two-State Coalition project, produced by an Israeli-Palestinian team, and reflects a unique bilateral perspective.

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